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Based on library research this thesis examines the contribution of the SADC’s peace and security 
efforts towards enhancing the larger security on the African continent. While it is acknowledged 
that peace and security involve peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building; the research 
focused only on the peace and security mechanisms of SADC between 1966 and 2009. A central 
argument is that the SADC’s peace and security system does enhance the evolution of a wider 
AU peace and security architecture. In furtherance of this argument, the thesis addressed the 
evolution of SADC from its predecessor the SADCC, the evolution of the African Stand by 
Force and the role of SADC in this process. In the end the study identified  the necessity for 
certain policy reforms to ensure SADC’s better contribution to AU’s over all peace and security 
architecture: i) being donor-driven, SADC should remain the driver of its projects and set its own 
agenda for projects and strengthen its financial management systems in order to attract 
international funding; ii) SADC members should commit themselves to implementing its policies 
and strengthening its National Committees (SNCs); iii) The responsibilities of the SADC 
secretariat need to be revisited to grant it more executive powers on decision-making for 
achieving its security agenda; iv) Limited and inadequate staffing hampers SADC’s overall 
security objectives, therefore, the SADC secretariat must be supported with additional capacity in 
competent programme management, planning, monitoring, finance, procurement and 
administration; and, v) HIV/Aids remains a challenge for SADC’s peacekeepers and a policy 
should be implemented to cater for peacekeepers by specifying a timeframe and length of period 
for deployment of military personnel on peacekeeping missions with a moratorium set for much 
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1. Chapter One: Introduction  
Peace and security is one of the key areas that this thesis focuses on. In the plethora of challenges 
to peace and security in southern Africa, the thesis addresses peacekeeping as one of those 
challenges by providing an illustration of SADC’s peacekeeping role under its SADC Organ on 
Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation (OPDSC). The thesis will not address southern 
Africa’s economic situation (regional integration and development has been addressed in chapter 
two) – however, this is key for the region’s stable peace and security architecture. The Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) created in 1992, with the main aim of achieving 
economic development and political stability in the sub-region. Earlier, southern Africa was 
involved in a struggle to shed a colonial history, support liberation movements in Angola, 
Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe, and anti-apartheid struggles in South Africa. Peace and 
security issues in southern Africa are now related to, political, economic, and social instability 
such as the HIV/AIDS pandemic and widespread poverty, the painstakingly efforts to create 
democratic rule, and efforts to maintain political stability and to promote regional integration and 
development. The SADC treaty of 1992 calls for its member states to promote peace and security, 
human rights, and democratic governance, and encourages the peaceful settlement of disputes. At 
its inception, SADC placed more emphasis on the economic stability of the region and less 
emphasis on peace and security issues. But with instability continuing in Angola and Lesotho and 
in an effort to rectify this anomaly, the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security (OPDS) 
was launched at a Summit Ministerial meeting in 1996. In 2001, the SADC protocol for the 
Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) was established. The OPDSC 
was intended to address intra and inter-state conflicts and promote political stability. The other 
main functions of the OPDSC were to devise appropriate mechanisms to respond to sub-regional 
conflicts through peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding measures with flexible and 
timely responses. Thus far, the record of SADC in managing sub-regional conflicts has been 
mixed. Military interventions in southern Africa have been plagued with divisions within SADC 
evident in previous peacekeeping efforts, such as the controversial interventions in Lesotho and 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) by SADC states, both in 1998. SADC has also 
been faced with the ongoing challenges of building operational capacity and a strong human 













which is a pre-requisite for establishing an effective security Organ for the southern African 
region. 
 
International Peacekeeping efforts have, since 1948, evolved into more comprehensive 
approaches and strategies with varied definitions. Egyptian United Nations Secretary-General, 
Boutros Boutros Ghali, published a landmark report on addressing peacekeeping in 1992, “An 
Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping”.1 This report 
outlined the complexities of peacekeeping missions and draws on i) “preventive diplomacy” as 
measures to build confidence, fact-finding, early warning, preventive deployment, and 
demilitarised zones; while ii) “peacemaking” deals with mediation, amelioration through 
assistance, sanctions, use of military force, and peace-enforcement units; iii) “peacekeeping” 
involves deployment of troops to separate warring parties; iv) “Post-conflict peacebuilding” 
includes comprehensive efforts to identify support structures to consolidate peace and provide a 
sense of confidence and well-being among people; while, v) “Cooperation with regional 
arrangements and organisations” involves the UN’s conflict management role with regional 
bodies.2 The design of peacekeeping in Africa has changed from previous peacekeeping missions 
towards a more holistic framework. This framework encapsulates a more nuanced approach to 
peacekeeping, incorporating a multi-dimensional approach to peacekeeping operations. 
Furthermore, peacekeeping operations could include comprehensive efforts to identify support 
structures to consolidate peace that provide a sense of confidence among people by cooperating 
with regional bodies and organisations.3 The United Nations, for example, does not have in its 
Charter of 1945, any specific reference to peacekeeping which is often referred to as “Chapter six 
and a half”, falling between Chapter six (peaceful settlement of disputes), and Chapter seven 
(peace enforcement).4 The African Union has already deployed past peacekeeping missions in 
Burundi (2003), Sudan’s Darfur region (2003), and Somalia (2007).5 SADC will form one of five 
sub-regional African Standby Brigades, a force designed to ultimately undertake peacekeeping 
operations that require observer missions and peacekeeping activities. However, the new thinking 
                                                
1 Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992), “An Agenda for Peace Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping” United Nations document 
A/47/277 – S/24111, 17 June, New York, United States. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Musifiky Mwanasali, (2009), “Overheating Chapter VII” in From Global Apartheid to Global Village: Africa and the United Nations Scottsville, 














about Africa’s peace and security architecture is about a multilateral approach by incorporating 
regional peacekeeping efforts that are comprehensive, systematic, and practical from a sub-
regional level to the continental and global levels.   
 
The transformation of the OAU into the AU in 2002 brought about the creation of other 
structures within the new body: the AU Peace and Security Council, the African Standby Force 
and the Military Staff Committee.6 July 2002 heralded the establishment of the Protocol of the 
African Union’s Peace and Security Council at the first ordinary session of the AU in Durban, 
South Africa, bringing together 53 African heads of state to adopt the protocol of the Peace and 
Security Council. The main purpose of the PSC is to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts on 
the continent, while serving as a security institution for early-warning and conflict management 
in order to facilitate timely and efficient responses to conflict situations in Africa. Under Article 3 
of the PSC, six key areas are stipulated: i) to promote peace, security and stability in Africa, in 
order to guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property, the well-being of the 
African people and their environment, as well as the creation of conditions conducive to 
sustainable development; ii) to anticipate and prevent conflicts in circumstances where conflicts 
have occurred - the Peace and Security Council has the responsibility to undertake peacemaking 
and peacebuilding functions for the resolution of conflicts; iii) to promote and implement 
peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction activities in order to consolidate peace and prevent 
the resurgence of violence; iv) to coordinate and harmonise continental efforts to prevent and 
combat international terrorism; v) to develop a common defence policy for the African Union, in 
accordance with article 4(d) of its Constitutive Act of 2000; and, vi) to promote and encourage 
democratic practices, “good governance” and the rule of law; to protect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law 
and contributing, towards efforts for the prevention of conflicts.7 For the Peace and Security 
Council to function effectively, support will be provided by the AU Commission, a Panel of the 
Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, an African Standby Force and a Special Fund.  
 
                                                
6 African Union Peace and Security Council. See website address: http://www.africa-
union.org/root/AU/organs/The_Peace_%20and_Security_Council_en.htm. 
7 African Union (AU) document, Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union, adopted at 













A July 2004 decision emanating from African leaders at the AU Summit meeting in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia, brought about the establishment of the African Standby Force.8  In June 2008, a 
further memorandum of understanding between the African Union and sub-regional bodies like 
SADC was agreed. The 2008 memorandum binds Africa’s eight main regional economic 
communities to the memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the area of peace and 
security. These include, the Southern African Development Community (SADC); the Arab 
Magreb Union (AMU); the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); the East African Community (EAC); the 
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS); the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); as well as 
the two regional mechanisms: the East African Peace and Security Mechanism (EAPSM) (which 
goes under the name, the Eastern African Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism, 
EASBRICOM); and the North Africa Regional Capability (NARC) (which goes under the name 
North African Standby Brigade, NASBRIG),  which are not managed by a regional economic 
community.9   
 
The thesis focuses exclusively on the Southern African Development Community’s architecture 
and its peacekeeping role in achieving regional integration and security in southern Africa. It is 
designed to ascertain how best SADC can contribute towards enhancing southern Africa’s 
regional peace and security efforts towards achieving greater security for the African continent. 
These issues are addressed in the five main chapters. Chapter one, which includes also the 
introduction, provides a synopsis of SADC’s evolving peace and security architecture. Also 
touched on is the role of peacekeeping efforts of the African Union, and the United Nations, 
detailing how SADC fits into this peacekeeping framework.  
 
In chapter two, discussed are three key areas of SADC’s evolving peace and security architecture 
and its efforts to promote regional integration and security in the region. In the first area, 
provided is a contextual background, sketching SADC’s predecessors - the creation of the Front 
Line States (FLS) and its role played in southern Africa’s liberation and anti-apartheid struggles 
                                                
8 African Union Standby Force. See website address: http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AUC/Departments/PSC/Asf/asf.htm#.  
9 African Union Commission (2008), Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the area of Peace and Security between the AU, the 
RECs, and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the regional standby brigades, (Conflict Management Division, CMD, Department of Peace and 













and efforts to create a cohesive region. The second key area addresses the Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) of 1980 and the transition made to SADC in 
1992. Also provided is an explanation why the transition was made and how this has impacted on 
regional security. The third key area of the chapter is a discussion of SADC’s main peace and 
security policies and their validity for promoting regional peace and security for the region. 
 
Chapter three examines SADC’s peacekeeping role and is guided by three key issues which 
include: i) a discussion on SADC’s peacekeeping role provides an understanding of its main 
institution that deals with peace and security – the Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security 
Cooperation of 2001 that was expanded on from the Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security of 
1996; ii) the second issue in the chapter deals with SADC’s peacekeeping activities in southern 
Africa and elsewhere in Africa; and, iii) this is followed by the third key issue whereby SADC’s 
standby brigade (SADCBRIG), and its role in forming part of Africa’s wider brigade, the African 
Standby Brigade (ASF) is assessed. Also assessed is the SADCBRIG timelines, in particular its 
readiness in making the 2010 deployment deadline in line with the ASF guidelines. The role of 
external actors such as the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) are also discussed, 
in terms of how their support can enhance SADC’s peacekeeping missions and the African 
Standby Force for the benefit of the southern African region and Africa as a whole. 
  
Chapter Four provides an assessment of SADC’s security challenges, which addresses seven key 
areas plaguing SADC’s security architecture. These include: I. Complex Scenarios; II. Building 
Solid Institutions; III. SADC’s Military Architecture; IV. Hybrid-Missions: SADC, the AU, and 
the UN; V. Addressing the Security Resource Challenge; VI. SADC Brigade Readiness: Building 
the African Standby Force (ASF) Capacity; and, VII. SADC’s Peacekeepers: Presenting a 
Challenge? The chapter deals mainly with identifying challenges that SADC faces in its 
peacekeeping efforts and its efforts in adopting constructive approaches in complex regional 
conflict scenarios. It is argued that an effective response to violent conflict requires building 
effective institutional structures. Further argued, is that effective responses to complex conflict 
require effective regional institutions. This discussion also identifies the gaps in SADC’s Organ 
on Politics Defence and Security Cooperation structures that could negatively contribute towards 













international actors such as funding and peacekeeping missions by the UN and the EU is 
explored. In recognising that SADC’s security architecture for the region has become more 
intricate and multidimensional, it is necessary to assess the anomalies that exist in SADC’s 
security policies which could hamper regional peace and security. Also discussed is how southern 
Africa’s regional security can be improved by providing an assessment of the SADC Brigade’s 
readiness as part of the ASF for rapid deployment in the region’s future conflicts. The chapter 
ends by noting that enhancing regional peace and security in southern Africa will require a firm 
commitment of resources such as peacekeeping personnel, funding, and clear timeframes. 
Finally, the thesis concludes by briefly providing policy recommendations in chapter five, for 
SADC and its institutions to consider in its future peace and security policies that can directly 
enhance and positively contribute towards peace, security and political stability in southern 
Africa.    
 
1.1. Research Question 
The thesis focuses exclusively on the Southern African Development Community’s architecture 
and its peacekeeping security role. It is designed to ascertain how best SADC can contribute 
towards enhancing southern Africa’s regional peace and security efforts towards greater security 
for the African continent and creating a Pax Africana.10 The major research question that is 
addressed in the proposed thesis is: 
Does SADC’s architecture have the potential to support southern Africa’s regional peace and 
security agenda?  
 
1.2. Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework guided by the main question as outlined in the above tautology. 
SADC’s architecture and its evolving security is discussed, by assessing its peacekeeping role 
between 1996 and 2009. It is my view that peacekeeping does not only entail deployment of 
military forces but is a holistic engagement that encompasses other facets, integral to the 
maintenance of peace, such as deployment of civilian police which is an integral part in the 
maintenance of peace. Through an analysis of SADC’s peacekeeping engagement during the 
period 1996 to 2009, the thesis aims to show its impact (if any) on southern Africa’s overall 
                                                
10 A Pax Africana is postulated as a triumph of continental jurisdiction, and perhaps of racial sovereignty. Pax Africana is borrowed from Ali 













regional peace and security. Although the thesis mainly focuses on SADC’s architecture and 
peacekeeping role, it is important to stress that peace and security do not happen in a vacuum, but 
are related to domestic and external actors and factors. Because of this inter-relatedness, the 
reality of peace and security determines both in policy and in practice what happens at a sub-
regional level, a domestic level, and a continental level.11 Hence, my conceptual framework has 
mainly focussed on peacekeeping within the SADC region, and in some instances, has only 
referred to sometimes and occasionally, if and where applicable and when necessary, to the 
African Union; the United Nations (UN); and the European Union (EU).  
 
1.3. Methodology 
The research component of the thesis, is based on library resources, secondary sources, speeches 
and key role-players. The research is qualitative and has not adopted a quantitative approach.12 
The research undertaken, has been geared towards better understanding the Southern African 
Development Community’s peacekeeping role and contributing towards collective security in 
Africa. While it is acknowledged that peace and security involves peacemaking, peacekeeping 
and peacebuilding; the research has only focused on the peace and security mechanisms of SADC 
between 1966 and 2009, and assessed how it can support the overall vision of Africa’s peace and 
security efforts. The research has involved a desk-based literature review.        
 
                                                
11  See the chapter on regional security in Barry Buzan (1991), People States and Fear: An Agenda For International Security Studies in the Post-
Cold War Era (Lynne Reinner Publishers: Boulder, Colorado), (second edition).  
12 Quantitative research is based on observations that are converted into discrete units that can be compared to other units by using statistical 
analysis. Emphasis is being placed on the statistical part of the research examination as the mo t essential part of quantitative research. 
Quantitative research is thus based on a positivist position. In 1830 Auguste Comte first coined the word positivism, which for him was 
synonymous with science or with positive or observable facts, based on measurable variables and provable propositions. Positivism is thus based 
on explanation, prediction and proof. In, “Science, Faith and Society”, Polanyi, M., 1946:21-42, purports that in research, personal judgments, 
intuitiveness and sensitivity plays a vital role in the world of the scientist itself. Qualitative research examines people’s words and actions in 
narrative or descriptive ways more closely representing the situation as experienced by the participants that is being researched. Qualitative 
research is based on a phenomenological position.  Phenomenology is to understand the meaning events have for individuals, where the person is 
viewed as having no existence apart from the world and similarly the world has no existence apart from the person. In summary, the debate in 
research should not be based on the correctness of qualitative versus quantitative theories, but should rather be all encompassing. Questions that 
need to be addressed in research should be ontology, epistemology, logic, and teleology. Ontological assumptions concern questions about the 
nature of reality; what is the nature of reality? Epistemological assumptions concern the origins of knowledge; what is the relationship between 
the knower and the known? and, what role do values play and contribute? Logic deals with principles of demonstration or verification. In the logic 
of inquiry, are casual linkages between bits of information possible? What is the possibility of generalisations? Teleological questions constitutes 
what does research contribute to knowledge? What is the purpose of research?  The answer to these questions makes up the postulates of the 
research paradigm and by paradigm I refer to a set of overarching and interconnected assumptions about the nature of reality. Assumptions cannot 













2. Chapter Two: Regional Integration and Security in Southern Africa  
2.1. Southern Africa’s History: A Contextual Background 
Southern Africa’s peace and security architecture has evolved over a long period with a history 
marked by intense inter and intra-state conflicts. The independence gained by seven southern 
African states from the 1960s represented was the beginning and an opportunity for southern 
Africa to unite. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) joined in 1998 and Madagascar 
who joined SADC as a candidate member in 2004 and was formally admitted in 2005,13 were the 
first two states that gained independence in 1960.14 This momentum was increased with other 
states gaining independence: Tanganyika, 1961 and Zanzibar in 1963 which together formed 
Tanzania in 1964; Malawi and Zambia both in 1964; and Botswana and Lesotho in 1966.15 Even 
though southern Africa states gained independence from colonialism, the destabilisation tactics of 
South Africa particularly in the 1980s, remained the core security problem in the region.16  
 
Between 1970 and 1974, the Frontline States (FLS) were created by a handful of five states 
(Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia) - formed to support the National 
Liberation Movements (NLMs): South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC); Namibia’s 
South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO); Angola’s Popular Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola (MPLA); (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) Mozambique’s Liberation 
Front (FRELIMO); and Zimbabwe’s two NLMs – the Zimbabwe African National Union 
(ZANU); and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU).  Zimbabwe’s NLMs also tried to 
unite, but failed.17 The origins of the FLS stem from the FLS’ founders and leaders: Tanzania’s 
Julius Nyerere; Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda; and Botswana’s Seretse Khama with the main goal to 
create political cohesion and a stronger security regime to support the region’s NLMs, gain 
political freedom from colonial rule, and overthrow white minority rule.18 The FLS initiative was 
expanded on, and in 1980, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference, was 
created by nine states (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
                                                
13 Gabriël H. Oosthuizen, (2006), The Southern African Development Community: The Organisation, its Policies and Prospects (Institute for 
Global Dialogue, IGD: Midrand, South Africa) p. 134.   
14 Ibid, pp. 53-54.  
15 Ibid. 
16 Frank Khachina Matanga, (2002), “Towards an Understanding of the Foreign Policy-Making Process of a New State: The Case of Namibia” in, 
Korwa Gombe Adar, and Rok Ajulu, Globalisation and Emerging Trends in African States’ Foreign Policy-Making Process: A Comparative 
Perspective of Southern Africa (Ashgate Publishing Company: Burlington, US). 
17 Oosthuizen, The Southern African Development Community, pp. 55-56. 
18 Khabele, and Kebapetse Lotshwao, (2009), “Political Integration and Democratisation in Southern Africa: Progress, Problems and Prospects” 













Zambia, and Zimbabwe).19 The FLS became SADCC and evolved into SADC which was said to 
be a western creation.20 SADC being the creation of the West had not been widely discussed in 
political circles. It is considered counterproductive and politically incorrect for western 
government officials to openly acknowledge that SADCC was the creation of the West for fear of 
the organisation being labelled an imperialist western puppet who wants to control southern 
Africa.21 However, a strong view exists that SADCC was designed by the West to have SADCC 
make the transformation from regional cooperation to market integration.22 The international 
community’s involvement in Africa since time immemorial has always been based on the 
premise of what it can get out of the region and Africa as a whole. This notion strongly centres on 
the principles of supply, demand, resources, and power. The involvement of the West in 
SADCC’s creation has never been for the sake of peace and security and it would be naïve to 
think otherwise. International donor support for southern Africa has been huge. External actors 
and international donors have provided 90 percent of SADCC’s budget though sometimes 
ambiguous roles were played. For example, between 1980 and 1986, the US government 
indicated that it did not see the southern African region developing without apartheid South 
Africa’s participation due to its strong economy.23 Hence, support received from countries from 
the West simultaneously provided funding for SADCC’s projects and several western 
governments continued supporting the apartheid regime.24  
 
Other differing views on the origins and the formation of SADCC, suggest that the FLS was a 
political response rejecting South Africa’s Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) 
invitation.25 Other scholars26 like, Daniel Ndlela note that the initial design of SADC took place 
in Brussels, created by a Briton, David Anderson, Managing Director of the Commonwealth 
Fund for Technical Cooperation (CFTC).  
 
                                                
19 Oosthuizen, The Southern African Development Community, pp. 53-54. 
20 Paul-Henri Bischoff, (2002), “How Far, Where To? Regionalism, the Southern African Development Community and Decision-Making into the 
Millenium” in, Korwa Gombe Adar, and Rok Ajulu, Globalisation and Emerging Trends in African States’ Foreign Policy-Making Process: A 
Comparative Perspective of Southern Africa (Ashgate Publishing Company: Burlington, US) pp. 288-289. Also see, Margaret C. Lee, (2003), The 
Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa,(University of Cape Town Press: Cape Town, South Africa), p.49. Also see, Abillah H. 
Omari, and Paulino Macaringue, (2007), “Southern African Security in Historical Perspective” in, Gavin Cawthra, Andre du Pisani, Abillah 
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“Upon Anderson’s retirement from Brussels, he sold the idea to the southern 
African ambassadors in London, notably to the Tanzanian Ambassador. Hence 
the first mission to Africa and the creation of SADC started from London and 
not from any southern African capital. Anderson in the company of an African 
diplomat first travelled to Dar es Salaam and met with the influential 
Tanzanian president, Julius Nyerere who gladly accepted the idea. With the 
wise counsel of Nyerere, the mission proceeded to Gaborone to brief the late 
President Botswana, Sir Seretse Khama.  This idea fitted in well for these 
leaders who were grappling with a South African apartheid regime and fierce 
military on their doorstep and its bullying tactics. Hence, even after the 
establishment of SADCC, the first executive secretary – a Zimbabwean 
national, Arthur Blummeris, was retired from Brussels where he was 
Zimbabwe’s ambassador to come and lead the new organisation. At the 
SADCC secretariat in Gaborone, British officials, including Anderson 
maintained the secretariat.”27  
 
SADCC’s secretariat was initially staffed by British nationals, and had only two Africans: the 
first executive secretary, Zimbabwean Arthur Blummeris and his personal secretary. In 1984, the 
SADCC staff structure changed with the death of Blummeris, the Britons were replaced by 
Africans from the southern African region and brought under the second executive secretary’s 
leadership, Zimbabwe’s Simba Makoni.28 Other interpretations of the formation of SADCC 
suggests that Mozambique came up with the idea at a meeting in June 1979 held for FLS officials 
and international cooperating partners to incorporate Zimbabwe into the southern African region. 
Other dominant views suggest that the FLS was founded on the basis of the ineffectiveness of the 
Mulungushi Club (Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zaire), in particular the autocratic regime led 
by Zaire’s Mobutu Sese Seko.29       
 
The political, military and economic muscle of South Africa was set to overpower the southern 
African region, to gain control, destabilise the region, and to wage war with Angola, 
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Mozambique, and Namibia (then South West Africa).30 Determined to remain the region’s 
political and economic hegemon, South Africa invited Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia) to be part of its 
grouping of a Constellation of Southern African States that included the fictitious independent 
states of Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda.31 The struggle for southern Africa 
continued to loosen the stronghold of South Africa’s apartheid regime.32 In 1980, southern 
Africa’s independent states declined South Africa’s invitation to join CONSAS.33 Zimbabwe 
having gained independence in 1980 emerged as southern Africa’s most important player in a bid 
to reduce dependence of member states on South Africa and to isolate the apartheid regime from 
the international community.34 Zimbabwe had the largest economy in the southern African region 
after South Africa. As an important player in southern Africa it fought against colonialism, white 
supremacy, and supported the liberation movements in neighbouring Mozambique, Angola, and 
South Africa. Zimbabwe was viewed as both the leader of the Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference and the Front Line States.35 In 1974 the military coup d’etat that was 
staged and deposed the regime of Marcelo Caetano in Portugal came as a shower of blessing, 
forcing the new regime in Lisbon after its April 1974, coup to promote positive changes in 
Angola and Mozambique.36 For southern Africa, this was a turning point in its history that 
allowed for major changes and events to occur, with Angola and Mozambique gaining their 
independence in 1975.37 Despite the successful independence gained by both Angola and 
Mozambique, South Africa continued destabilising the region. During the 1970s and into the 
1980s, South Africa was determined to fight the Marxist governments in Angola, the People’s 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola, which resulted in the South African Defence Forces 
(SADF) illegally occupying southern Angola.38 External actors played a pivotal role which was 
both productive and counterproductive dictating how southern Africa’s peace and security 
architecture would evolve. Cuban president, Fidel Castro assisted Angola’s struggle with the 
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deployment of 50,000 troops.39 In an attempt to prevent a Marxist MPLA government controlling 
the entire country, South Africa on the other hand was supported by the US-backed National 
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) to have victory.40     
 
Peace and security remained elusive for the southern African region. South Africa progressively 
continued its policy of regional destabilisation. Pretoria fought the Marxist government in 
Mozambique, strongly supporting the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO), against the 
Mozambique Liberation Front until a ceasefire agreement was reached and the first democratic 
elections were held in Mozambique in 1994. South Africa continued a 20-year war in Namibia 
against the South West Africa People’s Organisation, which ended in 1989 with Namibia 
eventually gaining independence in 1990.41 The costs of the war staged by South Africa through 
its policy of regional destablilisation in Angola, Mozambique, and Namibia, led to an estimated 
US$60.5 billion of damages between 1980 and 1988 and resulted in one million deaths and the 
displacement of millions of people.42 The political unrest that engulfed South Africa, between 
1984 and 1986 and the intense battle fought by its neighbouring states to gain the support of the 
international community to apply economic sanctions against apartheid South Africa were the 
ultimate turning point for southern Africa. The economic sanctions imposed, and the unrest and 
violence that engulfed South Africa was too costly. The mounting pressure on the apartheid 
regime led to it eventually abandoning its policy of regional destabilisation.43         
 
2.2. From SADCC to SADC: Towards a Development Community 
The further expansion of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference into the 
Southern African Development Community provided a multilateral platform for member states to 
achieve greater political and economic stability and regional security. SADCC, created in 1980 
and its formal establishment in July 198144, was initially a governmental partnership to 
strengthen economic development in the region, and to minimise dependence on apartheid South 
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Africa.45 The entire creation of SADCC was a difficult process and it became an international 
organisation through a long and arduous journey. External actors such as western donors were an 
important component for SADCC: they funded 90 percent of its budget and had enormous 
influence over the southern African region. This is evident when the US was backing South 
Africa’s invasion of southern Angola in 1975 while simultaneously funding SADCC and 
supporting the apartheid regime during the same period.46 SADCC’s member states had always 
envisaged South Africa as eventually being part of its organisation. Bearing this in mind, both the 
ANC and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) had observer status at SADCC’s annual Summit 
and annual Consultative Conferences.47 SADCC was the only regional economic community 
(RECs) in Africa that rejected the European Union’s (EU) market integration model and 
advocated aggressively for a regional cooperation and development model.48 
  
Since SADCC was already in 1976 a concept developed in Brussels, the fundamental change that 
occurred transforming SADCC’s 1980 Memorandum of Understanding and adopting its 1992 
SADC Treaty appears to have been inevitable for the southern African region. It became a 
product largely controlled by western governments and international donors that oversaw over 80 
percent of the organisation’s funding. The origin and creation of SADCC is vitally important 
since it suggests whether the Organisation has been able to develop African ownership of its 
numerous policies. SADCC members have been relying heavily on the support of external actors 
by way of funding. This was evident during the post-Cold War era (1974 – 1989) when southern 
African states received US aid of $53.7 million (1975-79); $154.4 million (1980-84).49 The 1974 
coup d’état in Lisbon that brought about changes in Angola and Mozambique raised concerns for 
the US, perceiving that the new communist movements and self-proclaimed Marxist regime in 
Angola and Mozambique would filter through into the region into Namibia and into South 
Africa. Hence, the US increased its aid from $5.3 million in 1975 – 1979 to $209 million in 1985 
– 1989.50 Other global events such as the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 resulted in a further 
increase in aid by the US, playing a supportive role to promote countries who were transcending 
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into democratic regimes such as Malawi: $58.4 million; Zambia: $41.7 million; and assisting 
with the resolution of civil wars in Angola: $29.4 million and Mozambique: $102 million.51 Post-
1994, South Africa received an annual amount of aid from the US of $112 million for the period 
1995 – 1996 that made it the largest America aid recipient in southern Africa.52  Also, between 
1989 and 1994, South Africa received $75.3 million annual funding from the US to work with the 
African National Congress regime towards a multiracial democratic society.53  More recently, in 
November 2008, SADC’s Double Troika and the European Union (EU) Troika met in Brussels, 
Belgium, to mark fourteen years of the  EU-SADC Dialogue under the Berlin initiative providing 
a package of €116 million for reinforcement of the SADC secretariat and 85 percent for regional 
economic integration for the Infrastructure Trust Fund, and other areas such as, the Water and 
Energy Facilities, the Development Cooperation Instrument, and the European Investment Bank 
Interventions for the southern African region.54 The Brussels meeting furthermore acknowledged 
funds in support of African security of €440 million since 2004 and allocated an additional €300 
million for the period 2008 to 2010 towards the EU Partnership of Peace and Security and in 
operationalising the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). These pledges and 
regional packages were made against an unambiguous tag attached that have not come without a 
price - aid for trade for European Union’s (EU) member states and other donors.55 The structure 
of the SADC Declaration states that foreign assistance is of vital importance, hence donors have a 
critical say in the business of SADC.56 
 
In April 1980, the leaders of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe met in Lusaka, Zambia, to adopt the “Southern Africa: Toward 
Economic Liberation” declaration as a first step to the formation of SADCC established in 
1981.57 The SADCC declaration established in Lusaka was an important policy instrument for the 
nine southern African states to rigorously promote their national and regional policies in order to 
gain political and economic liberation and independence from apartheid South Africa.58 In July 
1981, the SADCC structure was ratified at a summit of Heads of State meeting, adopting the 
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SADCC Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and providing members with an institutional 
framework. The headquarters was set up in Gaborone where it is still located. The SADCC 
Summit of Heads of State and government oversaw policy-making and met on an annual basis.59 
The SADCC Council consisted of ministers tasked to oversee the economic affairs of the region. 
Sectoral Commissions comprising of the Southern African Centre for Cooperation in Agricultural 
Research (SACCAR); the Standing Committee of Officials (SATCC); and the secretariat were 
the other structures that completed SADCC.60  
 
The problems that faced the southern African region have always been related to regional 
security, linked to issues of poverty and economic strife. Political and economic stability was of 
vital importance hence regional integration was to be SADCC’s response to oppose the wrath of 
South Africa. Key to the regional integration efforts of SADCC was the adoption of the SADCC 
Programme of Action (SPA), seen as an important vehicle to promote and obtain regional 
cooperation. The SPA was the means to achieve the participation and involvement of all SADCC 
members. Member states were tasked to oversee sub-sector and sectoral activities, at both 
national and regional levels.61 While sectoral activities were very important towards SADCC’s 
efforts in fostering security for the region through political and economic stability, external actors 
have been influential in SADCC’s ultimate success or its dismal failure. The sectoral activity was 
coordinated at the respective national levels through their respective national ministries.62  
 
The decentralised approach adopted by the SPA became problematic for the region and the 
integration process of projects was negatively affected. The problems that faced the 
decentralisation approach adopted by SADCC member states varied: donor preference for 
sectoral activities and funding allocated to projects that donors thought more important; lack of 
funding for sectoral activities that were equally important for the region; levels of competence 
varied among SADCC member states and some states were more competent and effective in 
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executing sector responsibilities; lobbying for sectoral funding occurred in advance with member 
states seeking donor support unilaterally, and proper procedures were not always followed. 
Therefore, the procedures of the Annual Consultative Conference held with its international 
cooperating partners became a dress rehearsal for discussions on donor support. Sectoral project 
activities became more national, and SADCC’s regional focus became less important and was 
neglected by member states. The decentralisation approach adopted clearly did not work. For 
example, funding from the US during the 1980s for SADCC’s regional transport and 
communications sector overseen by Mozambique was limited, because Mozambique was leading 
a Marxist government. The realities of the Cold War filtered through into the region. The 
breakthrough for the southern African region was reached in 1988, when a life-line was thrown 
by external actors: France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the former European Economic Community 
(EEC) provided military assistance against South Africa’s destabilising military aggression in the 
region.63 During the 1990s, South Africa became a strategic partner for the west particularly 
when it became a member of the southern African region. The US made more serious efforts to 
support the region’s transport and communications sector in the 1990s and secured funding 
through supporting South Africa initiatives.64 
 
SADCC soon realised that financing of its decentralised approach of its sector coordinating units 
was difficult to manage and more difficult to coordinate through its secretariat. This led to new 
strategies being adopted from 1985.65 This new strategy focused less on the coordination of 
project activities and more on coordinating activities through a more robust regional focus on 
sector policies and strategies. But the new coordination and development of sectoral regional 
activities also failed. In the early 1990s, SADC placed a moratorium on the creation of new 
sectors as well as adding additional projects to the SPA. In mid 1993, the SPA had 464 projects 
which required funding of $9 billion with only 22 percent of these projects found to be truly 
regional. By the late 1990s there were 19 sectors and the SPA had 380 projects. Although the 
main goal was to retain regional projects with adequate funding, only 49 percent of funds were 
secured. Similarly, members failed to provide resources for the adequate functioning of the 
SADCC secretariat. The lack of allocating sufficient resources and insufficient staffing of the 
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secretariat made it difficult for SADCC, and later also for SADC, to fulfil its role adequately. 
Member states were generally unhappy with the role that the secretariat played, particularly the 
inadequate staffing structure. By 1996 the secretariat had 10 professional staff and 20 
administration staff which increased in 2001 to 384 staff members comprising of both 194 
professionals and 190 support staff. Member states felt that the secretariat was grossly 
incompetent and the in-fighting within the Secretariat led to the public firing at a SADC Summit 
of its independent-minded executive secretary, Namibia’s Kaire Mbuende in 1999. A substantive 
executive secretary, Mauritius’s Prega Ramsamy was only appointed in 2001.  
 
SADCC’s evolving security architecture took on a difficult journey. Defence and security issues 
were initially a sub-structure under the FLS. The Inter-state Defence and Security Committee 
(ISDSC), the security leg of the FLS formed in 1976, was operating with no formal charter or 
institutional framework. Zimbabwe held the chair of the FLS and played an integral role in the 
ISDSC. During the struggle in Angola after 1975, the FLS played a key role in the region’s 
security architecture, especially in the battle over the Angolan town, Cuito Cuanavale in 1988 
against South Africa’s military. The FLS and later SADCC fought the struggle mainly against 
South Africa’s regional destablisation policy and its proxy wars. Key to the struggle was to 
secure and protect the transport infrastructure of the Beira, Lobito, Maputo, and Nacala railway 
lines frequently attacked by South Africa. SADCC was determined to loosen the stronghold of 
South Africa on the region’s transport systems. This determination led to SADCC members 
uniting to establish a consortium of private and public companies that included Malawi, 
Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Zambia’s transport corridor infrastructure. In addition, Zimbabwe 
provided military support to secure the Limpopo corridor that linked South Africa, Swaziland, 
Zaire (now DRC), Zambia and Zimbabwe to Maputo; and, SADCC received financial support 
from Botswana.66 With the major wars and battles being fought during the 1970s to late 1980s, 
made the coordination of SADCC’s regional activities cumbersome and almost impossible.   
  
Initially when the FLS was disbanded and replaced by SADCC and then subsequently by SADC, 
the Inter-state Defence and Security Committee was retained. Southern Africa’s security 
architecture was formally designed with the idea of fighting colonialism, racism, and the proxy 
                                                













wars staged by neighbouring South Africa. SADCC’s key hegemonic player between 1975 and 
1990 was Zimbabwe, seen as the economic giant. With the “new kid on the bloc” - South Africa - 
joining the southern African states, SADC had new battles to fight. These battles did not 
encompass a political agenda of racism and colonialism but was instead a battle over a clash of 
personalities,67 evident in Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe and South Africa’s Nelson Mandela. 
Robert Mugabe was not only the longest serving head of state in the southern African region, but 
was also the Chairperson when it joined the FLS which later became SADCC until 1992, and 
acquired significant regional status. After decades of draconian leadership displayed by apartheid 
South Africa, the democratic changes from 1990 under F.W. de Klerk, finally allowed for its 
inclusion in the SADC community. Being a key SADC member, the South African government, 
has since its first democratic election of 1994, incorporated regional integration into its policies. 
This is seen as the building bloc to harness good ties with its neighbours, in particular, in the 
security field.68 With South Africa having eventually transformed from a devastating apartheid 
past, and allowed into the circle of the southern African region’s fold, it became chairperson of 
SADC in 1996. This was a major bone of contention and a clash of personalities pursued between 
Mugabe and Mandela dividing the region and leaving member states to choose between South 
Africa (Mandela) advocating for an Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security (OPDS) integrated 
approach into SADC and reporting to the Summit, versus Zimbabwe (Mugabe) who strongly 
opposed the South African idea and felt that the Organ should be autonomous and have its own 
Summit.69  
 
SADC’s security architecture was further challenged by Zimbabwe when it sent troops to the 
DRC with Angola and Namibia and signed its own Mutual Defence Pact with all three states.70 In 
June 1996, at a SADC summit meeting in Gaborone, Botswana, the SADC Organ on Politics, 
Defence and Security was established.71 The establishment of the OPDS showed a commitment 
by SADC to regional security, but not sufficiently. The June 1996 Summit outlined that the 
OPDS “shall operate at the Summit level, and function independently from other SADC 
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structures; operate at Ministerial and Technical levels. The Chairmanship of the Organ shall 
rotate on an annual and Troika basis. The ISDSC shall be retained and be one of the structures of 
the Organ.” Three years later, in August 1999, at a Heads of State meeting in Maputo, 
Mozambique, SADC foreign and defence ministers came together to develop the sub-region’s 
collective security system.72 However, the mandate and activities assigned to the OPDS also 
became problematic, and were seen as taking on a broader state security agenda.73 In an attempt 
to deepen cooperation and trust among SADC member states, two bodies were established: the 
Inter State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) of sub-regional foreign ministers; and an 
Inter State Defence and Security Committee retained from the FLS, comprising ministers of 
foreign affairs, defence, public security and state security.74 At a Summit meeting in Maputo in 
1999, Zimbabwe was criticised for acting on behalf of the region without a clear mandate.  
 
Though SADC was created as an international organisation, in reality it was pushing ideals 
personified by its “heavy weights”, Nelson Mandela and Robert Mugabe. Even though South 
Africa was transforming its apartheid government, Mugabe remained wary of South Africa’s new 
political transformation. Mandela had strong concerns over human rights and democracy issues 
in Zimbabwe. All of these issues filtered into SADC’s security architecture and only changed 
once Thabo Mbeki took over the South African presidency from Mandela in 1999, advocating 
and adopting an approach of “quiet diplomacy”.75 Overall, member states felt that security needs 
to be part of the overall SADC agenda. The option for an independent Association of Southern 
African States (ASAS) was called for but shot down and the calls for an OPDSC won the debate. 
During 1996 the further delay of the institutionalisation of the OPDSC was mainly due to the 
Angola crisis; the Lesotho governance crisis; and the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) 
civil war.76      
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2.3. SADC’s Restructuring Process: From Rhetoric to Implementation 
In 2000, at an Annual SADC Consultative Conference held in Ezulwini, Swaziland, the meeting 
highlighted that of the 378 SADC sectoral activities totalling US$7.7 billion, the organisation 
effectively secured 50 percent of the budget through funding.77 SADC’s member states have 
generally been successful in securing funding to benefit the region, however the funding secured 
for regional sectoral activities were unevenly spent, with member states servicing national 
activities more than regional activities. Member states felt that they owned the process, and felt 
that part of SADC’s overall aims to secure the region and states’ sovereignty was enhanced 
through a decentralised SADC Programme of Action. However, due to some states pursuing 
more national interests than others, coupled with varying degrees of efficiency, restructuring of 
the SPA was imminent. The activities of the defence and security committee in comparison to the 
foreign affairs committee were still lopsided, with the defence and security committee seen to be 
more effective.78 SADC experienced many difficulties in the operationalisation of the OPDS 
mandate. The objectives of SADC are stipulated in its founding treaty of 1992. These objectives 
define the economic and political values of the institution and include the promotion of defence 
and security. As a regional economic community, SADC is able to legally take on security 
functions. Hence, in August 2001 at a summit of heads of state in Blantyre, Malawi, the OPDS 
was restructured through the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, providing 
SADC members with an institutional framework to coordinate policies and activities in the areas 
of politics, defence, and security. SADC’s principal instrument for dealing with security is its 
Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. The security architecture had already been 
drawn up by SADC at a 1996 Summit but only came into force in August 2001. The Organ 
operates at the level of heads of state, through a troika, that in turn reports to the SADC Summit 
of heads of state. Assisting the Organ is the ministerial committee comprising ministers 
responsible for defense, policing, and intelligence for SADC member states. The ministerial 
committee makes key decisions, and reports to the troika. The Organ’s operational activities are 
carried out by the Interstate Politics and Diplomacy Committee, and the Interstate Defence and 
Security Committee. SADC experienced many difficulties in implementing its new aims and 
objectives. There were doubts as to whether the Organisation’s security architecture would be 
                                                
77 See the discussion on SADCC’s Sectoral Activities in, Lee, The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa p.50. Also see, 
Oosthuizen, The Southern African Development Community.  













able to promote regional peace and security effectively.79 Further concerns raised an unclear 
work programme and lack of focus that did not link to SADC’s overall objectives. In 2001 
SADC’s current organisational structure still appeared inadequate with lack of resources and 
staffing. In addition the political tensions and divisions that emerged between Zimbabwe and 
South Africa threatened the possible immobilisation of the Organisation’s security work. The 
2001 Summit recommended improvements and changes to SADC’s institutional framework in 
order for it to execute its original 1992 mandate. The SADC OPDSC was put firmly under the 
control of SADC and a small secretariat of the Organ was established at the SADC secretariat in 
Gaborone. 
 
A further SADC extraordinary meeting in January 2002, in Blantyre, mandated the Organ on 
Politics and Defence Cooperation to provide guidelines for its Protocol on Politics, Defence and 
Security Cooperation. By 2004, the Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ (SIPO) was created by 
SADC focusing on four main areas: political; defence; state security; and public security 
sectors.80 Also approved, were the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the development of SIPO, 
establishing a Task Force comprising the Troika of members with a one-year rotating chair to 
coordinate SADC’s security policy.81 With the Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ being the 
driving force behind the region’s security, it is important that member states work together to 
build effective security architecture in southern Africa. SIPO provides a five-year strategic and 
activity guideline for implementing the OPDS Protocol. It covers a range of objectives and 
activities. SIPO has also developed additional policy documents such as the Mutual Defence Pact 
that was signed at the August 2003 SADC Summit. SIPO still has to operationalise and develop 
an implementation apparatus and business plan to engage with its politics, defence and security 
area effectively. SIPO has a broad understanding of security through its governance and 
democratisation issues as well as its defence and security issues but, with divergent opinions and 
approaches. Hence, some member states in the region places more emphasis on state security 
issues while others place more emphasis on human security.82           
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The 21 sectoral committees and commissions responsible for SADC’s planning and 
implementation member-state activities were shut down and revamped into four clusters in 
2001.83 The four clusters are the directorates for Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment (TIFI); 
Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources (FANR); Social and Human Development and Special 
Programmes (SHD); and Infrastructure and Services (IS). Three separate units were also 
established on HIV/AIDS, Statistics, and Gender. SADC’s institutional reforms envisaged a more 
efficient secretariat which aimed to provide for stronger leadership, ensure that its programmes 
are more regionally focused, and narrow the gap between rhetoric and implementation. A further 
three units were also established in the office of SADC’s Executive Secretary for: policy and 
strategic planning; resource mobilisation; and legal affairs. The new directorates’ focus on 
regional integration, mobilisation of financial resources, policy development, and providing 
assistance to member states. SADC member states each established a SADC National Committee 
(SNC) overseeing national coordination and implementation.84 By 2005, SADC continued to 
experience challenges with little achievements in its restructuring and institutional regional 
integration agenda. The secretariat was also widely seen to be inefficient and had staffing 
problems, management constraints, and incapacity issues. By the end of 2004, the secretariat 
managed to appoint the heads of its four directorates and staffing for each directorate was beefed 
up to ten per cluster. The most basic administrative resources such as adequate access to email 
and communications have been a continuous problem at the secretariat.85 The mandate of the 
secretariat is mainly administrative with no political decision-making powers. A gap between the 
relationship of the secretariat and member states remains a challenge. In addition, the 
administrative unit of the Organ also established at the secretariat has been staffed by less than 
ten staff since 2003.86 An additional secondment was made from South Africa to the Organ’s 
Chair in 2005. The Organ has been expanded into a fifth directorate, headed by a chief director 
with three sub-divisions on politics and diplomacy; defence, security and strategic analysis; and 
an early warning and situation room. The Organ has an entirely separate governing structure with 
its own Troika reporting to the SADC Summit. Below the level of the Organ Troika is the 
Ministerial committee comprising ministers of foreign affairs, defence, public and state security 
from each member state. Persistent problems still exist with the relations between the Organ and 
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the secretariat. This remains a major challenge with both the Organ and the Secretariat sharing 
the same support staff, but having entirely different governing structures.87 
 
SADC operates on the basis of a consensus and its key governing institutions for its social and 
economic areas are the Integrated Committee of Ministers (ICM), the Council of Ministers, the 
Troika (past, current and incoming Chairs of SADC) and the Summit. The ICM still lacks the 
ability to provide direction on programmes and activities for the various sectors and similarly 
lacks the ability to provide strong policies and a coherent flow of information between 
government departments at the national level.88 The Council of Ministers on the other hand, 
appears to spend too much of their time on administrative detail and seems to lack overall 
leadership.89 The Troika system has also failed to provide strong political leadership between the 
meetings of the ICM and the Council of Ministers. To narrow this gap between rhetoric and 
implementation, SADC established a Committee of Ambassadors in February 2005 in Gaborone, 
Botswana.90 The functioning of the OPDSC is defined by SIPO, which sets out a detailed 
programme of activities for its key political, defense, public security (policing) and state security 
objectives.91   
 
It is crucial that SADC creates a balance how it views security. SADC’s security architecture has 
evolved over three decades and its present rhetoric needs to be tied down into operations. 
Integrated systems that deal with security are of critical importance. SADC’s security architecture 
should not only focus on military and policing issues, but also promote common values for its 
member states. Such values and ideals should promote democracy, human rights, safe and secure 
societies, and the establishment of early warning systems throughout the region. SADC made 
good progress at its 2001 Summit decision to centralise the coordination and implementation of 
its programmes in order to strengthen its secretariat. But this is not enough. At a consultative 
conference in Windhoek, Namibia in 2006 and at a further consultative meeting in April 2008, in 
Port Louis, Mauritius, SADC’s role was re-examined. These two conferences sought to address 
SADC’s capacity and its performance against the commitments made at its 1992 Windhoek 
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Declaration. The findings were that: SADC’s secretariat remained weak, lacked human and 
financial management capacity, and was not able to facilitate strategy development and policy 
harmonisation within the region.92 At a SADC Summit in Maseru, Lesotho, in August 2006, two 
important decisions were made: One, to establish a task force on regional economic integration; 
and, second to strengthen the role of the secretariat, and to review the role of the Integrated 
Committee of Ministers. Furthermore, the Council of Ministers instructed the secretariat to 
participate in an evaluation of all its staffing positions with an attempt to realign the secretariat’s 
organisational structure to SADC’s priorities. To this end, the job evaluation was undertaken by 
an auditing firm, KPMG.  In addition to KPMG’s evaluation was the European Union’s support 
for a similar evaluation undertaken by the Ernst and Young auditing firm which undertook an 
institutional assessment of the secretariat that focused on operational policies and procedures. 
Germany financed a similar evaluation through GTZ and inWent focusing on SADC’s capacity 
needs. The evaluations adopted were critical and stressed the need to address capacity constraints 
of the organisation.93 
 
The February 2008 SADC Council of Ministers meeting proposed a number of changes to the 
organogram of the secretariat. The main purpose for the meeting was to clarify the lines of 
authority and to improve the coordinating activities of the secretariat’s senior management. 
Hence, the vacant post of chief director was to be eliminated and replaced with two deputy 
executive secretaries.94 The deputy executive secretary for regional integration is responsible for 
and oversees regional integration within all the technical directorates: Trade Industry, Finance 
and Investment; Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources; Infrastructure and Services; Health, 
Labour and Skills Development; and Policy, Planning and Resource Mobilisation. In addition, 
the deputy executive secretary for regional integration provides direction to the secretariat by 
recommending regional policies, and by providing strategic impetus and coordination with other 
RECs.95 The role of the deputy executive secretary for finance and administration oversees two 
directorates and is responsible for the Human Resources and Administration; and Budget and 
Finance clusters. The OPDSC has its reporting line through its Organ directorate directly to the 
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executive secretariat.96 SADC has since its inception struggled with a capacity gap hence the 
August 2008 Mauritius conference calls for strengthening SADC in a proposed Capacity 
Development Framework. The assumption is that should the secretariat embrace the priorities of 
the Framework that encompasses both the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 
(RISDP) of 2001, and the Strategic Indicative Plan (SIPO) of 2004, the priorities must include 
functions such as: i) a think tank to guide members on the implementation of SADC’s common 
agenda; ii) a principal regional coordinator of policies, strategies and programmes for regional 
integration; iii) a provider of support services to the technical directorates and convening annual 
consultative conferences for SADC’s decision-making structures; and, iv) a professional 
programme manager to facilitate, implement and systematically prioritise programmes and 
provide a business plan and budget. In addition, the SADC Capacity Development Framework 
includes ten intervention areas97 intended to strengthen the SADC secretariat’s capacities and 
calls for a Bridging Facility through which donor funding can be channelled. The SADC 
Capacity Development Framework was endorsed by the SADC’s Council of Ministers in August 
2008. Funding has always been the key stumbling block for SADC activities, and Germany’s 
KfW has already stepped in to provide interim support and funding for the new Framework until 
such time that South Africa’s Development Bank of Southern Africa (DbSA) is able to take over 
the funding task.  
 
The SADC OPDSC has also been fully integrated into the SADC secretariat as one of its 
technical directorates. The OPDSC still reports directly to the executive secretary. The elevated 
role afforded to the OPDSC has its origins from its successor, the Inter State Defence and 
Security Committee and the Front Line States. The debate since 1992 to 1996 centred on how to 
bring on board the FLS and ISDSC within the new SADC and may divert SADC’s main focus 
from economic development and integration. The functions and role of the SADC executive 
secretary cannot be over stressed. The executive secretary has a critical role to play in the current 
political challenges that faces the southern African region. Political unrests evident with the 
ousting of president Ravalomanana in in Madagascar in March 2009 by former Antananarivo 
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mayor, Andry Rajoelina; the reported attempt on Lesotho prime minister’s life; the volatile 
situation in Malawi; Swaziland; and the ongoing violence in the DRC. Such conflicts in the 
region require strong leadership and executive power that is able to work alongside the chair of 
the Organ to successfully manage emerging violence and political turmoil in the region.98 The 
role of the SADC executive secretary does not have sufficient power to provide strategic 
leadership at regional level. The current SADC executive secretary, Mozambique‘s Dr. Tomaz 
Salomão has made remarkable efforts to bring about stability in the region, but SADC still has to 
clearly devise the role and functions of the executive secretary to give it more clout and better 
synergy with the Organ chair. However, the current deputy executive secretaries in charge of the 
economic and administration agendas respectively may be able to free up the SADC executive 
secretary to perform more political functions and focus on the stability of the region.      
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3. Chapter Three: SADC’s Peacekeeping Role 
This chapter examines three key issues. First, it provides an assessment of how the role of 
SADC’s peacekeeping evolved in the southern African region and elsewhere in Africa. Second, it 
assesses the SADC Brigade as one of the regional brigades and its readiness for the 2010 
deployment timeline and how this will fit into the overall ASF structure. Thirdly, the importance 
of external actors, such as the United Nations and the European Union is discussed in support of 
SADC’s peacekeeping support missions, and how the African Standby Force can benefit overall 
from such external actors. 
 
3.1. Politics Defence and Security Cooperation 
Since the establishment of SADC’s OPDSC in 1996, the Organ’s mandate has been to oversee 
conflict prevention, establish a regional peacekeeping force, coordinate foreign and security 
policy of member states; strengthen democracy and human rights; and establish a mutual defence 
pact. The basic structure of the OPDSC comprises: the chairperson and the office of the 
chairperson; the troika; the Ministerial Committee (MC); the Inter State Politics and Diplomacy 
Committee (ISPDC); the Inter State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC). Together the 
MC, ISDSC, and the ISPDC are the SADC Organ’s ministerial committees.99 The Organ was 
also brought under the authority of the SADC Summit and chairmanship and became rotational 
from being solely chaired by one country: Zimbabwe.100 The Organ has its own Troika system 
consisting of three heads of state (the chairperson, Mozambique; Swaziland; and Zambia).101 In 
1996 the Organ was established as a semi-independent institution headed by the president of 
Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, but remained ineffectual due to political tensions in the region and 
the uneasy relationship between Zimbabwe and South Africa.102 The Organ was set up with its 
own regional structures and mechanisms for decision-making, a small permanent secretariat, and 
an administrative unit is based at the SADC secretariat in Gaborone.103   
 
The SADC Troika system - sometimes referred to as the Double Troika - has an incumbent 
chairperson, an incoming chairperson who also serves as the deputy chairperson for one year and 
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immediate or previous chairperson who can take quick decisions on behalf of SADC that are not 
taken at SADC’s regular policy meetings. The Summit of Heads of State and Government 
Summit meet annually; while the Council of Ministers meets biannually. These meetings 
transpire in February to approve SADC annual budgets and also in August, to prepare the 
Summit agenda. Provision is also made for extraordinary Summit and Council meetings if and 
when the need arises. The Troika is also applicable at the level of the Standing Committee of 
Senior Officials comprising the permanent or principal secretaries accounting for government 
offices, and ministries. These rules of engagement also apply to the Troika of the OPDSC. The 
chairperson of the Organ does not hold the chair of the Summit simultaneously. The Organ is 
coordinated at the level of Summit on a Troika basis and reports to the Chairperson of SADC. 
The functioning of the Organ is defined by the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) of 
2001, with a detailed programme of activities against key political, defense, public security sector 
(policing), and state security objectives. With the Organ operating at the level of heads of state 
through a Troika, it reports to the SADC Summit. How this works in practice, is through the 
ministerial committee which in turn reports to the Troika and makes the key decisions. The 
ministerial committee consists of ministers of defense, policing, and intelligence from SADC’s 
15 member states. The Organ’s operational work is carried out through the two committees of 
senior officials: the ISPDC; and the ISDSC. The main responsibility of the Organ is security 
cooperation for member-states based on principles of common and collective security and mutual 
defense, and provides a framework for operationalising the SADC Brigade. The Protocol for the 
OPDSC empowers the Organ to deal with both inter-state and intra-state conflict such as civil 
wars, military coups, or gross human rights violations. In August 2003, the Mutual Defence Pact 
was signed committing member states to develop both individual and collective defence 
capabilities and to cooperate on defense training, research and intelligence issues.104               
 
3.2. Peacekeeping in Southern Africa: Dilemmas and Prospects  
Past peacekeeping efforts by SADC in southern Africa occurred in an ad hoc manner determined 
by the willingness and capability of its member states to undertake peacekeeping operations 
within the region. SADC in general has had very little peacekeeping experiences. Most of 
SADC’s peacekeeping engagements have been conducted through hybrid-African Union (AU) 
                                                













and UN missions. A controversial military intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC) in 1998, allowed for the formation of a Mutual Defence Pact between Angola, Namibia 
and Zimbabwe.105 SADC has also seen mixed results in South Africa and Botswana’s direct 
military intervention in Lesotho in 1998, side-stepping SADC, without a clear mandate.106 The 
attack on the Lesotho Highlands Water Project by the South African National Defence Force 
(SANDF) undoubtedly left a bitter taste in the region; the attack resulted in the killing of 
58107members of the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) and approximately 47 civilians. Such 
unilateral interventions undertaken by some of SADC’s member states should be more 
multilateral and better planned in the future. Egyptian UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros 
Ghali, published a landmark report on peacekeeping in 1992, “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive 
Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping”.108 This report outlined the complexities of 
peacekeeping missions and draws on i) “preventive diplomacy” as measures to build confidence, 
fact-finding, early warning, preventive deployment, and demilitarised zones; while ii) 
“peacemaking” deals with mediation, amelioration through assistance, sanctions, use of military 
force, and peace-enforcement units; iii) “peacekeeping” involves deployment of troops to 
separate warring parties; iv) “Post-conflict peacebuilding” includes comprehensive efforts to 
identify support structures to consolidate peace and provide a sense of confidence and well-being 
among people; and, v) “Cooperation with regional arrangements and organisations”.109 The 
design of peacekeeping in Africa has changed from previous peacekeeping missions towards a 
more holistic framework. This framework encapsulates a more nuanced approach to 
peacekeeping, incorporating a multi-dimensional approach to peacekeeping operations.  
 
3.3. SADC Brigade: Towards A Viable African Standby Force 
The African Standby Force (ASF) to be set up by 2010 entails strengthening the capacity of sub-
regional brigades for peace support operations, enhancing the capacity of national defence forces, 
and training of civilian police for peace support missions. The AU provides a roadmap for its five 
brigades and Planning Element (PLANELM) – a framework guided by operationalising six 
scenarios and missions. Scenarios 1 to 4 is aimed at deployment required within 30 days from an 
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AU mandate resolution further outlined in: scenario 1- AU/regional military advice to a political 
mission; scenario 2- AU/regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission; scenario 3- 
stand-alone AU/regional observer mission; and, scenario 4– AU/regional peacekeeping force for 
peacemaking and preventive deployment missions. Scenario 5 involves an AU peacekeeping 
force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions, whereby the African Standby Force 
is required to deploy within 30 - 90 days; Scenario 6 – in genocide situations where the 
international community does not act promptly, it is envisaged that the AU would have the 
capability to deploy a robust military force within 14 days. Furthermore it was envisaged that as a 
first phase, scenarios one and two would be complete by June 2005; and phase two by June 2010. 
The AU at this stage would have developed the capacity to manage complex peacekeeping 
operations, while the Regional Economic Communities (RECs)/regions will continue to develop 
the capacity to deploy a mission headquarters for scenario four, that involves AU/regional 
peacekeeping forces.110  
 
Already in the late 1990s based on a recommendation of the AU’s predecessor, the Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU), the ISDSC decided to have a 5000 to 6000 brigade size as a standing 
regional peacekeeping force for deployment on peace and humanitarian missions (but not for 
peace enforcement), but the restructuring of SADC and the AU overtook events.111 Over the 
years, has peacekeeping in Africa become more and more complex and moved beyond conflicts 
between states to wars within states. Peacekeeping has evolved into a multidimensional operation 
that calls for operations that are able to assess the political, social and economic dimensions of 
both inter and intra-state conflicts. Such operations involve the promotion of dialogue to restore 
and maintain the rule of law and human rights by protecting civilians. In August 2007, the SADC 
Brigade was launched in Lusaka, Zambia.112 The concept and design of security in southern 
Africa includes a wider concept of human security in its policy documents. The 2007 SADC 
Summit launched the SADC Brigade as a regional and multidimensional peace support operation. 
The Protocol on OPDSC states that security should be approached through peaceful cooperation, 
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enhance mutual security, and manage humanitarian disaster.113 Southern Africa’s collective 
security arrangement was put into place by its Mutual Defence Pact of 2004. This is a collective 
defence arrangement for its members from external aggression that is guided by the 2001 SIPO 
policy framework for security cooperation in the region.114 By August 2008, eight SADC 
member-states signed the Mutual Defence Pact policy: Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and South Africa.115 The establishment of the SADC Brigade 
along with the other four standby brigades of the African Standby Force will perform 
observations and monitoring missions, peace support missions, and interventions for peace to 
restore regional security. The SADC Brigade will also serve as a preventive deployment 
mechanism in order to prevent conflicts from escalating. Besides peacekeeping, other duties 
would entail post-conflict reconstruction such as disarmament, demobilisation of militia or ex-
combatants, and providing humanitarian assistance to countries’ civilians in war-ravaged areas.             
 
A major goal of the African Standby Force is to never allow another catastrophic situation as the 
1994 genocide in Rwanda in which 800,000 people were killed. Hence, it is accepted that the 
SADC Brigade will be part and parcel of a peacekeeping process and would deploy peacekeeping 
missions on the continent that not only seeks the restoration of peace, but also involves processes 
of peacebuilding and preventive action. It is now also expected that the AU will deploy first 
followed by a United Nation multidimensional peace support operation.116 Hence, at an early 
stage, given this scenario, the ASF will seem to create conditions on the ground that could lead to 
a comprehensive peace agreement.117 The SADC Standby Force, as one of the five standby 
brigades of the ASF, will perform observation and monitoring missions; peace support missions; 
interventions for peace and security restoration at the request of member states; preventive 
deployment; peacebuilding; as well as post-conflict disarmament and demobilisation and 
providing humanitarian assistance in conflict areas. African governments are already seeing an 
increasing responsibility in peacekeeping operations on the continent.118 The ASF structures and 
operationalisation frameworks are being established and SADCBRIG will manage complex 
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peacekeeping missions. Extensive119 training has been conducted since January 2000 by the 
Southern African Defence and Security Management (SADSEM)120 network closely 
collaborating with: civil society groups and military officers in security institutions in eight 
SADC member states: South Africa, Namibia, Tanzania, the DRC, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, 
Botswana and Zambia. Training has already been provided to more than 1000 senior officials, 
military officers, and civil society leaders. Peacekeeping entails a holistic design in keeping with 
SADC’s security policies. Peacekeeping has evolved from the traditional peacekeeping approach 
where generally a military force is deployed to manage conflict between two belligerent forces to 
a more multidimensional peacekeeping and support operation which involves multidisciplinary 
mandates and multidimensional structures that include civilian police units and the military. The 
military is generally tasked to ensure stability and security and the police oversee reinstating a 
reliable law enforcement system. SADC, like the other four African Standby Brigades, will have 
special battalions and units with forces on standby. Civilian professionals will be overseeing the 
missions’ administration in terms of the political, economic, and development aspects of the 
SADC Brigade. These professionals will be required to create and maintain a peace support 
operations database and will need to receive the requisite professional skills and expertise to 
apply to peace support operations.121 Resources such as peacekeeping personnel, funding and 
timeframes are critical aspects to ensure a successful operation.  
 
3.4. Operationalising the SADC Brigade 
SADC’s Planning Element (PLANELM) was established at its Gaborone secretariat in 2005 as a 
tool of the OPDSC and takes guidance from the SADC Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff 
and the Committee of Police Chiefs. Therefore, SADC thought it appropriate to have its logistics 
base in Botswana. SADC’s PLANELM will not be included in the deployed force, and SADC 
member states will each ensure that the pledged forces are available and have a level of training 
as outlined by, and comparable to, the regional peacekeeping training centre in Harare, 
Zimbabwe. SADC will not set up a permanent brigade headquarters. This will only be put in 
place when the brigade is to be deployed.122 The ASF is relying heavily on the regional hegemon, 
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South Africa in SADCBRIG, and (Nigeria in ECOBRIG) to support the areas of logistics and to 
compensate for weak members with lesser infrastructure. In support of co-member states, the 
South African National Defence Force has pledged a parachute battalion, engineering capability, 
sanitation, a field hospital, patrol boats, signal capacity, drivers, naval support vessel and air 
transport to fill the resource and capacity gaps that other SADC members may lack.123 
 
Civilian Police (CIVPOL) has become an important element for peacekeeping operations. The 
ASF protocol has provided a number of - 240 police officers for peacekeeping missions. 
According to Motumi, (deputy director-general: chief defence policy and planning in the 
secretariat of the South African department of defence)124 the coordination of activities of 
CIVPOL in peacekeeping operations has expanded since the 1990s. In acknowledging the 
important role of CIVPOL in peacekeeping operations, synergy between the military and police 
staff have expanded towards greater cooperation. For example, South Africa has already, in 2004, 
committed CIVPOL units to exercises such as Blue Crane and Blue Hungwe.125 Armed conflicts, 
civil wars, and armed rebellions, are some of the major problems threatening stability in the 
southern African region and throughout Africa. Such threats require a rapid response from well-
trained military and civilian police officials. Approaches to peacekeeping must have well 
synchronised military operational procedures in order to achieve impact. SADC is hopeful that 
the southern African region will have the desired military interventions envisaged.  
 
In February 2009, in Angola’s northern Bengo province, Cabo Ledo, SADC Brigade completed 
its first exercise, overseen by the Head of Peace Mission, Mathendele Moses Dlamini who 
headed the SADC Dolphin Phase I Mapex military exercise and also was the planning phase.126 
In April 2009, the SADC Standby Brigade held its second phase of the SADC Brigade Command 
Post Exercise (CPX) in Maputo, Mozambique, codenamed: Exercise Golfinho.127 The exercise 
conducted in Mozambique was a preparatory exercise for military, police, and civilian decision-
makers with command, communication, control and coordination techniques (C3). A follow up 
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exercise was held in September 2009 for final field training (FTX) in South Africa in a fictitious 
country, Lohatla, created for training SADC’s 8200-strong brigade.128 According to Article 13 of 
the African Union Peace and Security Council Protocol of 2002, the regional brigades need to 
test the brigades’ capability to handle conflict situations in line with the United Nations 
peacekeeping framework.129    
 
Of critical importance to any peacekeeping mission is logistics and capacity which are often 
neglected.130 Conceptualising logistics in a military setting involves aspects such as - design and 
development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance; evacuation and 
disposition of material; movement, evacuation and hospitalisation of personnel; acquisition, 
construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities; and acquisition and or, 
furnishing services.131 In essence the inappropriate conduct of considering military operations 
without proper logistic and capacity support can make or break a peacekeeping intervention. 
Other important facets for peacekeeping operations involve the deployment of civilian police, and 
humanitarian agencies. CIVPOL as an integral component of peacekeeping operations were first 
deployed during the UN’s first peacekeeping mission in the DRC (Congo) during the 1960s to 
accompany local police, monitor police behavior and serve as a support unit. Hence, during the 
1990s CIVPOL played various important roles and became integrated in various missions, for 
example in Namibia, Haiti, Cambodia, Eastern Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mozambique and 
Somalia.132 SADC’s first peacekeeping exercise that took place in 1997, in Zimbabwe, 
codenamed, Exercise Blue Hungwe, deployed elements of CIVPOL to the peacekeeping exercise. 
In 1999, SADC staged a second military peacekeeping exercise in South Africa, codenamed, 
Exercise Blue Crane into which CIVPOL was also incorporated. The lessons that emanated from 
these exercises highlighted the importance of CIVPOL and the need for more structured 
coordination between the military and CIVPOL for successful peacekeeping missions.133 Be ides 
aspects of logistics, also important is the varying expertise of military expertise among SADC 
member states and its contributing forces. Peacekeeping operations will carry no weight without 
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a clear understanding of what SADC’s peacekeeping entails, is composed of, and is expected to 
do. This can only occur with a clear understanding and adequate training. Hence, SADC’s Organ 
directorate has two credible subsidiarity organisations to support peacekeeping operations. The 
SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC), and the Southern African Regional 
Police Chiefs Coordinating Organisation (SARPCCO) both based in Harare.134 The RPTC was 
previously shut down after the government of Denmark withdrew funding due to Zimbabwe’s 
political unrests in 2001. It was revived and funding is being pursued.135 SADC and the RPTC 
have been addressing the RPTC’s training programme of the SADCBRIG for the African 
Standby Force. RPTC will be addressing training capacity needs for multidimensional peace 
support missions. The focus of the training will be provided to both police and civilian 
components. RPTC’s training will be aligned with Southern African Regional Police Chiefs 
Cooperation Organisation136 to ensure proper cohesion. SARPCCO is to be responsible for 
providing technical expertise for police agencies in the region and also act as the regional office 
of Interpol. More importantly, SAPRCCO has been assisting SADC to implement its protocol on 
small arms.137                  
 
3.5. The Principles of Interoperability- Towards Rapid Deployment Capability 
The importance of adequate logistics in peace missions is also provided in Article 9(c) of the 
SADC Mutual Defence Pact: “joint research, development and production under license or 
otherwise of military equipment including weapons and munitions, facilitation of the supply of, 
or procurement of defence equipment and services among defence-related industries, defence 
research establishments and their respective armed forces.”138 Peacekeeping is complex: the lack 
of resources and infrastructure in areas where deployments need to take place and timely 
transporting infrastructure and resources to such areas are important and can affect the mobility 
of military forces in terms of supply. The unnecessary delay in providing logistical support can 
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escalate violent conflict. Equally important, is the need for specialised equipment coupled with 
command, control and communication and de-mining in certain areas of deployment.139 Other 
factors that need to be filtered in and provided for are: air cargo handling teams, logistical load 
teams, forklift equipment, military police contingent, water purifications systems, airfield crash 
rescue and fire-fighting teams, trucks and trailers.140 Problems of interoperability can determine 
the success or failure of a peacekeeping mission. It is imperative that a standby force must have a 
single and a unified command, and a single doctrine. All equipment used in a given peacekeeping 
mission must be interoperable and compatible. For example, a 2000 status report of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) revealed that the failure of former eastern bloc countries 
joining the European regional security system was due to a lack of harmonisation of defence 
policies, and military integration of personnel and systems, coupled with out-dated equipment 
versus NATO’s hi-tech equipment and infrastructure.141  
 
Whether a division of labour for the five regional brigades of the African Standby Force will 
enhance the maintenance of peace and security for Africa is an important question and this may 
relate to concerns of interoperability for ASF. Already evident and in existence is a wealth of 
experiences in west Africa’s five ECOWAS peacekeeping missions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Guinea Bissau, and Côte D’Ivoire. The main brigade (ECOBRIG) of the ECOWAS standby force 
with 5000 soldiers, is ready for deployment within 90 days. In addition the ECOWAS standby 
force has a high readiness component of 2773 soldiers at 30 days readiness. ECOWAS has 
already in place a task force chief of staff, a task force headquarters, and an operational planning 
element, and has identified three centres of training excellence: the National Defence College in 
Abuja; the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KPTC), Accra; and the 
Ecole de Maintien de la Paix Alioune Blondin Beye in Bamako, Mali.142 A division of labour 
among the region’s five brigades can enhance SADCBRIG’s operational plan towards the 
ultimate African Standby Force for the continent. One of SADC’s members, South Africa, 
committed to providing logistical elements as it did to the United Nations Organisation Mission 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) in 1999.143 The ASF concept of rapid 
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deployment capability (RDC) within 14 days, in cases such as genocide, still needs to be 
finalised. Cost implications for a rapid deployment capability, is estimated at US$300 million per 
year.144 In southern Africa, the core RDC will be done by Angola, South Africa, and Zimbabwe 
on a rotational basis. These plans designed in the ASF and its regional brigades require adequate 
funding. Previous AU and SADC peacekeeping missions have highlighted that sustained 
interventions require sustained resources and funding.145 The United Nations Charter, under 
Chapter VIII, allows for cooperation between regional bodies and the UN. The operational plan 
of the AU Standby Force and how SADCBRIG as one of the brigades effectively work in joint 
peacekeeping missions, will require more planning. 
 
Africa’s five regions have conducted various training activities and joint exercises. However, the 
main issue for the ASF must be to facilitate the interoperability of all forces. Interoperability is 
one of the major challenges that face regional brigades based on the various and differing 
standards for operational procedures, equipment, and training backgrounds.146 The official 
language for missions at the regional and continental levels needs to be addressed to ensure 
effective command and control of missions.147 The AU is currently in the process of conducting a 
continental training exercise, codenamed, Exercise AMANI, to assess the operational readiness 
of the ASF’s various brigades. This exercise will be conducted with the support of the EU’s Euro 
RECAMP programme.148 Euro RECAMP is an EU Council (ESDP) project that was taken over 
from France to reinforce the capacities of African armies with regard to prevention, management 
and resolution of conflicts and will run from 2008 to 2010. Since the African Union’s peace 
facility is created from the European Development Fund (EDP), Euro RECAMP can only provide 
support to sub-Saharan Africa with the exception of South Africa. It will not finance hard-core 
military costs, such as salaries of troops, uniforms, and arms, but will support peace support 
operations, capacity building, conflict prevention, mediation and some aspects of post-conflict 
reconstruction.149          
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The African Union has already deployed past peacekeeping missions in Burundi (203-2004), 
Sudan’s Darfur regions (2003-2007), and Somalia (since 2007). The experience of these AU 
missions deployed, confronted the difficulty of sustaining peacekeeping missions n the field, 
when faced with financial and logistical weaknesses.150 The UN High-Level Panel of 2004151 
clearly outlined the increase in the deployment of UN peacekeepers with 60,000 peacekeepers 
deployed in 16 missions. Hence, for peacekeeping to be effective, the UN High-level Panel of 
2004,152 called for promotion of collective security. Such collective security entails the 
availability of peacekeepers; prompt and effective responses to current challenges facing 
peacekeeping missions; and making use of regional and sub-regional based peacekeeping 
missions. Further robust calls were made in the 2004 report of the UN High-level Panel to ensure 
that post-conflict peacebuilding processes are sufficiently resourced.153 A standing fund of $250 
million was suggested to finance expenditures and to focus on the areas of post-conflict 
reconstruction, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants. A UN Peacebuilding 
Commission was established in December 205. The Southern African Standby Brigade, being 
part of the African Standby Force, is designed to ultimately undertake peacekeeping operations 
that require observer missions and peacebuilding activities. The ASF structure is based on the 
model of the Nordic Standby High Readiness brigade (SHIRBIRG). The ASF will, however, be 
taking on much larger peacekeeping tasks.154 The African Union will have to act swiftly and 
implement all the aspects of its memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the area of 
peace and security between itself, the RECs and RMs.  
 
3.6. External Actors 
Finally, the involvement in peacekeeping in southern Africa of the international community, such 
as the UN is important given the expensive nature of peacekeeping. In 2003, the EU established 
the Africa Peace Facility which had made €300 million available for peacekeeping and related 
capacity building by 2006.155  By March 2007, the EU had contributed a further €400 million for 
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Darfur and the US $350 million for the same mission. The EU at present provides about €104 
million directly to SADC for ongoing projects.156 Furthermore, SADC’s Secretariat and 
Directorates’ technical capacity through the EU 10th European Development Fund for 
development cooperation with SADC will provide €135 million for the period 2008 to 2013.157 
The artificial timeframe set by the AU to have all five brigades operational by 2010 appears to 
have been set based on the 2008 to 2010 deadline given by Brussels under the EU-Africa strategy 
in order not to lose out on the €300 million that had already been secured.158 On 3 February 2010, 
the pressure taps were turned on by the European Commission in its meeting with the African 
Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to ensure that the African Peace and Security Architecture 
(APSA) is on track and funding criteria adhered to.159 The European Commission at the February 
2010 meeting addressed the main objectives of the first set of measures to be funded from the 
second African Peace Facility (APF), 10th European Development Fund (EDP) which provides 
increased financial resources for the period 2008 to 2010 of the APF of €300 million. The 
following decisions emanated from the meeting:160 a) continuation of ongoing activities that have 
been provided for under the African Peace Facility capacity building programmes of the 9th 
European Development Fund in line with re-allocations; b) inclusion of new activities, including 
support to establish and strengthen the AU liaison offices for the RECs and RMs, enhancing 
mediation capacity within the AU, RECS and RMs; greater support to the AU Peace and Security 
Council and similar structures of the RECs and RMs as well as the African Standby Force; c) the 
continuation of the €6 million capacity building progammes through the joint salary scheme to 
commence in July 2010; while early deliverables need to be agreed upon at the Nairobi workshop 
between 8 and 12 February 2010 regarding the African Peace Facility support to training centres 
to be finalised under the second APF funding at the end of February 2010; d) the 1st APF funds 
will continue and be measured against programme effectiveness; e)  and the expiry date for re-
allocation of funds of €7,5 million and €20 million is set for June 2010; f) the APF early response 
mechanism (ERM) which became operational in 4 November 2009 was financed at €3 million 
from the total contribution agreement of €15; g) the EU will conduct an evaluation and 
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assessment of the entire African Peace Security Architecture’s components and policies in order 
to address and assess conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post conflict phases by mid-
March 2010; h) to expand AU representative offices in Brussels, New York and Cairo and set up 
EU Liaison offices in the RECs and RMs before the end of 2010; and finally, i) to assess the EU 
contributions made to the AU’s Year of Peace and Security at the next EU-Africa Summit in 
November 2010.161  
 
In concluding this chapter it is important to note that the EU’s big agenda has made no mention 
of future funding support for the ASF and its brigades beyond the current deadlines. SADC will 
have to make use of these time frames and get all its ducks in a row to ensure a more effective 
peacekeeping system in southern Africa. This chapter assessed how SADC’s peacekeeping 
evolved in the southern African region and elsewhere in Africa. Peacekeeping in the southern 
African context will not only entail monitoring ceasefires and maintaining a peaceful 
environment, but peacekeeping that is expected to help pave the way for reconstruction and 
sustainable development in the region. Also assessed, was the SADC Brigade as one of the 
regional brigades, and its readiness for the 2010 deployment timeline and how this will fit into 
the overall ASF structure. The civilian component is an important aspect in addressing issues 
such as human rights, maintaining good governance and the rule of law. All these components all 
add up to the critical success of peace missions and similarly to tackle the recurrence of violence. 
The importance of external actors, such as the United Nations and the European Union was 
discussed, in support of SADC’s peacekeeping support missions, and how the African Standby 
Force can benefit overall from such external actors. In the DRC in particular, SADC is already 
assisting with UN peacekeeping operations and the UN is more and more relying heavily on the 
partnerships with regional and sub-regional organisations to effectively assist in peacekeeping 
efforts.162   
    
 
 
                                                
161 African Union and European Union, (2010) “6th Meeting of the Joint Coordination Committee of the African Peace Facility, pp. 1-3. 














4. Chapter Four: SADC’s Security Challenges 
This chapter discusses the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) security 
challenges and identifies seven key areas that need to be addressed and these are: i. Complex 
Scenarios; ii. Building Solid Institutions; iii. SADC’s Military Architecture; iv. Hybrid-Missions: 
SADC, the AU, and the UN; v. Addressing the Security Resource Challenge; vi. SADC Brigade 
Readiness: Building the African Standby Force (ASF) Capacity; and vii. SADC’s Peacekeepers: 
Presenting a Challenge?  
 
The chapter thus addresses the challenges that SADC faces in peacekeeping efforts between 
warring states or parties and examines how to approach complex regional conflicts. It argues that 
an effective response to violent conflict requires building effective institutional structures. The 
gaps identified in SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) 
structures that negatively contribute towards sustainable regional peace and security is also 
discussed. The involvement of international actors such as funding and peacekeeping missions of 
the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) is also explored. Recognising that 
SADC’s security architecture for the region has become more intricate and multidimensional - 
the chapter also assesses the anomalies that exist in SADC’s security policies that can hamper 
regional peace and security. The SADC Brigade readiness of the ASF for rapid deployment in the 
region’s conflict areas is further assessed. Resources such as peacekeeping personnel, funding, 
and timeframes are the final critical aspects for enhancing regional peace and security, which is 
interrogated in this chapter.  
 
4.1. Complex Scenarios  
Southern Africa states are developing states, plagued by weak governance structures such as 
parliamentary and electoral systems; inadequate security and justice systems; public 
administrations that are either absent of dysfunctional; and a deadening poverty evident in post-
election conflicts in countries such as Zimbabwe, Lesotho, and recently Madagascar.163 These are 
key ingredients that lead to conflicts that can spiral into violence that inevitably lead to the 
collapse of states and lawlessness. Africa overall is still confronted with corrupt governance 
structures that leads to governments not adequately delivering on, or at times not at all on the 
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most basic social services for its citizens. The reality of conflict in Africa has many dimensions 
and is at most conflict over scarce resources as well as exploitation of natural resources among 
different groups and regions which has as its root causes a historical dimension of ethnic 
dominance, manipulation and violence evident in such countries as the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (DRC) and Sudan. Resource-based conflicts have many dimensions and actors. Such 
actors include: government military groups, rebels, insurgents, private militias, warlords, 
mercenaries, private security companies, and multinational corporations (MNCs).164 These actors 
often accumulate wealth by gaining direct and indirect access to resource-rich areas such as the 
DRC’s diamonds, cobalt, oil, zinc, copper, and gold; and, Sudan’s oil. Furthermore, such 
conflicts where armed militia groups are involved, using civilians as a tool of war and the most 
vulnerable groups of society are often targeted such as the rape of women and recruitment of 
children,165 as soldiers.166  
 
4.2. Building Solid Institutions  
An effective response to violent conflict requires effective institutional structures. The SADC 
secretariat is seen as, the “engine room” of the Organisation where everything should come 
together. The roles and responsibilities of the secretariat cannot be too over emphasised. The 
Mauritius conference of August 2008 made considerable progress for the SADC secretariat with 
the approval of the SADC Capacity Development Framework. This may not be enough for 
achieving the desired outcome of an effective SADC secretariat. For the secretariat to move from 
the “engine room” to becoming the driver, SADC may need to add more weight to the roles, 
responsibilities, and decision-making power of the secretariat in order to achieve positive results 
in its security architecture. The SADC Council of Ministers is viewed as a very important 
structure of the Organisation with major powers invested in it. The Council coordinates the work 
of the Organ and its structures and reports to the Organ chairperson.167 Instead of adopting a 
multidisciplinary approach to the issue of defence, politics, and security, and empowering a 
committee of foreign ministers to manage SADC’s affairs, the SADC treaty of 1992 authorised 
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the ministers of economic planning and finance to form the Council of Ministers. This has not 
worked sufficiently ever since, and the region’s key concerns of politics, defence, and security, 
have been compromised. The functions of the Inter State, Politics and Diplomacy Committee 
(ISPDC) also face several challenges in executing SADC’s administrative role with its incoherent 
systems.168 The Organ Directorate having to oversee four sectors: political and diplomatic affairs, 
defence, security and the regional peacekeeping training centre has a staff complement of 20 
people. Its staff capacity is inadequate, hampering the Organ Directorate’s ability to function 
effectively.169 The Organ Directorate services the SADC Organ Troika and its network 
committees, and primarily services the ISDSC. SADC’s governing structures often task the 
Organ directorate with a mandate beyond its budget and its staffing capacity, with the Organ 
having a minimal developed business plan and budget in comparison to other SADC directorates. 
The Organ’s responsibilities have been overwhelming: overseeing peace and security 
preparations for a standby force; addressing SADC’s mediation efforts in Lesotho, Zimbabwe 
and the DRC; dealing with anti-corruption, politics and governance issues and deployment of 
election observer missions in member countries; developing a mediation framework study and a 
study on training initiatives for peace support missions; and overseeing two subsidiarity 
organisations based in Harare – the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation 
Organisation (SAPRCCO), and the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC).170 SADC 
will have to address urgently the Organ’s staffing and financial capacity in order to ensure that 
the region’s political and security agenda is realised.                
 
4.3. SADC’s Military Architecture 
The SADCBRIG is an important component for southern Africa’s stability and was developed at 
a very important point in the history of the region. Southern Africa is still vastly poor with elites 
still pushing the political agendas in countries such as Zimbabwe, Angola and the DRC. Southern 
Africa’s conflicts have their root causes in deprivation of the most basic needs such as food, 
shelter, safety, and belonging. It is inevitable that such conflicts will spiral into violent conflict 
seen recently been played out through intra-state conflicts that spilled over into the DRC’s 
borders. The extensive training for SADC’s police and military personnel may present a 
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challenge and some militaries have staged coups to overthrow states, evident in the recent cases 
in SADC member states - Lesotho and Madagascar.171  
 
The Protocol for the OPDSC is extensive and far-reaching which allows the Organ to deal with 
both inter-state and intra-state conflicts such as gross human rights violations, civil wars, and 
military coups, among other violent communal conflicts. The Mutual Defence Pact of 2004, for 
the OPDSC of 2001 is also loosely designed and does not articulate in practice how it will be 
applied to an intervention, as well as its relationship with the SADC Brigade. In turn the synergy 
between the SADC Brigade, the African Union’s Peace and Security Council and the United 
Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) must also be clearly defined in terms 
of how peacekeeping is going to be undertaken in a given peacekeeping support operation. SADC 
should start defining how to intervene by making use of the UN’s DPKO and could do this with 
the current DRC conflict at its doorstep. South Africa’s role should be more influential by using 
its economic muscle and contributing more economically as well as with its strong military 
(South Africa has 1400 troops with the UN mission in the DRC). The role of the United Nations 
is critical in terms of support and capacity. The UN intervention in Angola in 1992 failed 
dismally and hence the UN may need to work more closely with SADC in future. The African 
Union has played an important role in the region in resolving southern African conflicts by 
providing an authorising role in SADC interventions, and has previously worked alongside the 
United Nations in peacekeeping operations. For example, in 2003, the AU established a 
framework for deployment of a peacekeeping mission in Burundi: the African Mission in 
Burundi (AMIB). This mission was led by South Africa’s military, with support from 
Mozambique and Ethiopia, and taken over by the United Nations in 2004. 
 
In June 2003, former South African president, Thabo Mbeki announced in parliament that South 
Africa’s peacekeeping effort in the DRC was costing R819.6 million over a twelve-month 
period.172 Also in 2003, South Africa’s military involvement in Africa’s “First World War” in the 
Great Lakes, deployed 1 600 soldiers in Burundi and costs were estimated at R783 million.173 
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With SADC looking to South Africa to secure and carry the burden of the region’s peacekeeping 
agenda this may not be that feasible in future. The costs of peacekeeping missions are 
overwhelming and not to be underestimated. It costs the United Nations US$100 million (R1 
billion) a month to maintain a brigade size of 1000 military personnel during a peacekeeping 
mission.174 The funds that South Africa used in the DRC peacekeeping operation was only repaid 
by the United Nations several years after the original expenditure occurred.175 South Africa may 
not be in a viable position to do this. Deployment of a military component within 14 days 
(scenario six of the ASF PLANELM – presents a challenge for SADCBRIG given the 
maintenance costs envisaged to have a deployment contingent ready for rapid deployment – the 
ASF policies may want to incorporate into its policies that scenario six is done on a rotational 
basis within SADC and its other regional brigades.176        
 
4.4. Hybrid-Missions: SADC, the AU, and the UN 
The recommendations of a report of the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s High-level 
Panel on “Threats, Challenges and Change” of 2004177, highlighted that effective peacekeeping 
requires collective security. Such collective security entails the availability of peacekeepers; 
prompt and effective responses to challenges facing peacekeeping missions; and making use of 
regional and sub-regional based peacekeeping missions that are sufficiently resourced.178 
Collective security has been evident in peacekeeping missions in Africa such as those of the 
United Nations. Of the 63 UN peacekeeping missions deployed, between 1948 and 2009, 27 were 
conducted in Africa and four in southern Africa. Presently, of the 17 UN peacekeeping missions 
deployed globally, 7 are in Africa.179 Since the United Nations is deploying peacekeepers to 
address Africa’s conflicts, the new thinking around peacekeeping structures for the African 
Union may be either viewed as a duplication of the UN’s role, or taking away its responsibility. 
However, the complexities of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa particularly after the brutality 
of the Rwandan genocide of 1994, which left 800,000 people dead, has raised grave concerns 
over the ability of the world’s most powerful security body and questioned its ability to deal with 
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complex peacekeeping missions.180 This resulted in a search for “best practices” for UN 
peacekeeping interventions, led by Kofi Annan during his period in office, from 1997 to 2006. 
Annan seconded former Algerian foreign minister, Lakhdar Brahimi, to lead a Panel on United 
Nations Peace Operations. A comprehensive review of the United Nations Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations was undertaken followed by the submission of a report in August 2000, 
known as the Brahimi report, which recommended an increase in the size of DPKO and 
improvement in the UN’s deployment capacities.181  
 
Since, the AU’s peacekeeping management capability is in the developing stages, it may only be 
able to deploy small missions and resort to adhoc management capability as seen in the current 
struggling African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). Past peacekeeping engagements such 
as the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) (2003-2007) also raised serious challenges.182 Clear 
command and control structures at strategic, operational and tactical levels and provision of 
requisite military and technical capabilities are needed. SADC and the ASF need an integrated 
and interoperable command, control, communication, and information system infrastructure to 
link deployed units with mission headquarters and with AU planning elements (PLANLEMs) and 
regions.183 The issue of interoperability is important and much of this could be alleviated through 
structured and coherent training. To have an overall ASF ready for deployment with critical 
elements place requires adequate training and overcoming language barriers between contingents. 
The SADCBRIG has made some progress in working towards Scenario 6. However, much more 
still needs to be done in order to standardise ASF within and across regional brigades. Training 
must address the interoperability of brigades from different regions. Different SADC member 
states have 15 different brigades with different standards for operational procedures, approaches, 
equipment, traditions and backgrounds in training. Furthermore, the remaining ASF’s 38 states 
within the four other brigades will face challenges as well. A key challenge remains with not only 
sourcing the funding but developing an appropriate financial administrative system and 
framework to ensure efficiency and transparency. The SADC Secretariat has created a Bridging 
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facility through which donor funding can be channelled. At the continental level, the AU has to 
ensure that funding for ASF missions are timeously funded and effectively administered.  
 
4.4.1. Who will Keep the Peace? 
For Africa, there will always be a peace to be kept, but the key question that should instead be 
addressed is - who will keep the peace? -  who will intervene in emergency situations in Africa’s 
conflict prone states?184 A UN 2008185 peacekeeping operations document highlights key lessons 
to be adhered to if peacekeeping operations are to succeed. This document raises an important 
question: Whether there is a peace to keep?186 The 2008 document notes that a UN peacekeeping 
operation can only succeed if the parties on the ground are genuinely committed to resolving the 
conflict through a political process. Furthermore, it notes that a UN peacekeeping operation 
deployed in the absence of such a commitment runs the risk of paralysis and under a worst case 
scenario, being drawn into a conflict, and possibly losing its impartiality. According to the AU 
Policy Framework, the ASF should hand over mandates and responsibilities to the UN.187 This 
could pose a security challenge since a reluctance to approve a stronger United Nations 
peacekeeping operation in Rwanda in 1994 by its Security Council has posed serious handicaps 
to Africa’s overall regional security. For example between 1945 and 1990, the UN Security 
Council passed 193 vetoes of peacekeeping initiatives.188 The nature of conflicts in Africa has 
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4.4.2. Multidimensional Peacekeeping: A Deficit? 
A major challenge for regional brigades is to address the peacekeeping gap of the UN launching 
interventions timely in Africa’s conflicts. The new UN policy clearly outlines that a United 
Nations peacekeeping operation can only deploy a peacekeeping operation with the commitment 
of parties on the ground to genuinely resolve the conflicts through a political process.190 The UN 
will not intervene in the case where there is no peace to keep such as in Somalia, irrespective of 
continued violence, loss of human lives, and displacement of people.191 While the authorising of 
a UN peacekeeping operation requires nine votes (and no vetoes from the five permanent 
members – the US, Russia, China, Britain, and France) from the Security Council’s 15 members, 
divisions within the Security Council are likely to send mixed messages to parties in conflict. 
This could undermine the legitimacy of missions in the eyes of the parties and may make room 
for “spoilers” at both local and regional levels.192 The reverse could impact positively on the 
peace process on the ground and greatly enhance a peacekeeping operation. Furthermore, 
missions approved by the UN Security Council take a minimum of six months before being 
deployed on the ground.193 The responsibility of the ASF to affect a timely response to conflict 
interventions thus rests in its hands.  
 
4.5. Addressing the Security Resource Challenge 
Funding and resources are the bedrock for successful peacekeeping interventions and SADC 
should draw lessons from other peacekeeping engagements.194 For example, experiences by the 
African Union’s peacekeeping missions in Burundi, Sudan’s Darfur regions and Somalia between 
2003 and 2009, have exposed the difficulty of sustaining peacekeeping interventions when faced 
with financial and logistical weaknesses.195 The Southern African Standby Brigade, being part of 
the African Standby Force, is designed to ultimately undertake peacekeeping operations that 
require observer missions, and sustained interventions will require sustained resources and 
funding.196 The United Nations Charter, under Chapter VIII, allows for cooperation between 
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regional bodies and the UN. Stemming from the December 2007 Lisbon summit with Africa197, 
the European Union has articulated as one of its projected plans, a clear plan of action in support 
of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) defined in the African Union’s PSC. In 
2004, the EU provided €250 million, and a further €300 million in 2006 towards the AU’s peace 
and security architecture.198 These funds are aimed at benefiting the AU Peace and Security 
Council and the African Standby Force. One of SADC’s member states, the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, gained EU support for UN peacekeeping efforts in 2003 and 2007/2008.199 Given 
the expensive nature of peacekeeping, it would be important for SADC to tap into such resources 
through the UN and the EU. SADC should make use of such structures in order to improve 
peacekeeping and enhance the capacities of member states with lesser military expertise. At both 
regional and continental levels, progress has been made for securing funding initiatives. These 
resources have been successfully secured through the European Development Fund for SADC’s 
peace and security architecture. A thematic group is also being constructed to provide a business 
plan and budget for the Organ’s regional projects in the politics, defence and security areas.200 At 
continental level, the African Union has expanded its international cooperating partners to 
include India. The April 2008 New Delhi Declaration as well as the Africa-India Framework for 
Cooperation, have been adopted. The Framework outlines commitments by India to the AU and 
Africa’s post-conflict reconstruction; enhancing the civilian component of peacekeeping 
operations; policing; human trafficking; disaster management; and, humanitarian intervention. 
Thus far there has been limited capacity in the area of peacebuilding at the regional level. 
However, it is envisaged that this will change in the near future.201 
 
4.6. SADC Brigade Readiness: Building the African Standby Force Capacity 
The ASF and its five regional brigades are critical for ensuring the protection of ordinary 
civilians especially, women and children, in violent conflict areas. They cannot easily dispose of 
this role, nor relinquish it and rely too heavily on the UN. It is most likely that ASF will have    
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40 000-strong202 peacekeepers by 2010. However, the ASF may not have a force available to be 
deployed immediately for Scenario Six interventions. SADC and Africa overall, are moving in 
the right direction and displaying the desire and political will to establish a standing force. A key 
security challenge facing SADC is to move beyond ordinary peacekeeping and to beef up its 
peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction activities. Conflict management, negotiating peace 
agreements, and mediation strategies are all key facets that could be a cost-saving mechanism, 
and SADC should more actively enhance such structures. There are instances where countries 
relapses back into war and back into conflict such as the DRC. SADC should find effective ways 
and strategies to involve the UN to assist in addressing the root causes of conflict and deal with 
their triggers effectively. It should also call on external donors and the international community 
to assist in post-conflict reconstruction such as humanitarian assistance, refugees, revitalising 
repatriation, political, economic and social structures, and most importantly disarmament, 
demobalisation, disintegration, and reintegration of ex-combatants and militia groups back into 
local communities. Africa’s regions have already conducted various training activities. NARC is 
the newest brigade and has had no planned training exercises. The AU is in the process of 
implementing continental training for all its five brigades to check brigade readiness, by March 
2010.203  
 
A former force commander, General Martin Luther Agwai for the AU/UN hybrid operation in 
Darfur has stressed the relevance and critical importance of sufficient resources for peacekeeping. 
For example, the minimum requirement for combat helicopters, are between 12 and 18, and no 
country was able to supply the UN/AU-Darfur mission with these resources. Hence, in 
September 2007, the attack on the UN/AU hybrid peacekeepers in Darfur, cost the lives of 10 
peacekeepers because of the considerable time that was taken to move the injured (eight hours). 
This can be avoided in future if the appropriate resources are in place.204 Overall peacekeeping 
operations undertaken by the AU and RECs have had serious difficulties in Burundi, the 
Comoros, Côté d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Somalia.205 Timely 
responses to conflicts in these areas were made. However, constraints of mandates were due to a 
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lack of military capabilities, insufficient resources, and inadequate institutional capacity to plan, 
manage, deploy and liquidate operations.206 To deal with the problem of military capabilities, at 
both continental and regional levels will require logistics depots to be established. The AU has 
also developed a logistics concept paper in this regard, but, this has not been implemented as yet 
due to lack of locations for the six logistical depots due to political reasons and has yet to be 
implemented.207 SADC’s South Africa National Defence Force has been tasked to develop a road 
and rail strategic lift concept, and the Algerian National Defence Force has been requested to 
develop the air and sea lift capabilities for NARC Brigade. However, the AU and its RECs still 
need to address acquisition of resources and mechanisms for operationalising these initiatives.  
 
4.7. SADC’s Peacekeepers: Presenting a Challenge?  
Nowhere in the ASF policy frameworks for the establishment of the African standby force and 
the military staff committee as well as the memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the 
area of peace and security between the AU, RECs and RMs, is HIV/AIDS mentioned. This is 
quite alarming, because if there are limited brigade forces, who is going to keep the peace? 
SADC’s Bridging Funding Facility should address this challenge and implement sound policies, 
with practical solutions that are realistic while still addressing the human rights of peacekeepers. 
Currently, the guiding numbers for ASF peacekeeping operations for regional brigades range 
between 5000 and 3500 troops; 500 military observers for standby duty; and 240 police officers. 
It may be more beneficial for the ASF to raise its numbers for police officers from 240 to 1000, 
in order to maintain an effective peacekeeping force mission. SADC needs to take this into 
account and it is simply not enough to say that field officers refuse to be tested. The length of 
time that forces are deployed on peacekeeping mission should also be reconsidered. It may be 
worth looking at a policy that provides a specific timeframe and length of period for deployment 
of military personnel. A moratorium could be set, for much high-ranking officials who are 
overseeing peacekeeping missions. South Africa is the largest troop contributing force for the 
SADC Brigade. However the major problem facing SADC centres on the extent of HIV/AIDS in 
SANDF (estimated at 23 percent),208 and how this will affect southern Africa’s security 
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challenges of contributing towards the ASF and to peace and security for the region. In 2006, the 
South African Department of Defence (DOD) reported that during 2006 of the 34,810 members 
tested for HIV/AIDS, 30 percent tested positive,209 and in some SADC countries estimates are as 
high as between 40 to 60 percent.210   
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5. Chapter Five: Conclusion and Recommendations 
Since the post-Cold War period, has the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) 
identity changed dramatically and peace and security in the sub-region has involved more intra-
state violence that spills across borders threatening wider regional stability. This warrants 
initiatives such as the African Standby Force (ASF) to deal with peace and security in a holistic 
manner. South Africa joining SADC in post 1994 has also changed the face of peace and security 
issues in the region. South Africa’s transition gave hope to the southern African region, ending 
destabilisation by apartheid South Africa, and a post-apartheid regime cooperating peacefully 
with states in southern Africa.  
 
SADC’s continuity has always been ensured by a supportive donor community. In 1995, 
European Union foreign officials and SADC met in Berlin, Germany, to discuss and promote 
closer trade and political, regional and economic relations.211 This was a very different gathering 
that took place to the Berlin Conference, 100 years earlier, staged also in Berlin – the famous 
conference of 1884 -1885, - under the supervision of Germany’s “Iron Chancellor”, Otto von 
Bismarck, when the rules were set for Africa’s territories to be effectively carved up by Europe’s 
imperialist powers: Britain, France, Portugal, Belgium, Spain and Germany.212 Post-conflict 
reconstruction is expensive, and SADC must try to rely on the UN and other external donors. 
SADC also needs to find ways to ensure that it remains the driver of its projects and sets the 
agenda for its policies. Similarly, it must ensure that it is not dictated to by its international 
cooperating partners too extensively.  
 
SADC’s Mauritius Conference of 2008 also proposed the implementation of a Bridging Fund 
Facility for short to medium-term projects that started in the 2008 and 2009 financial year. The 
Bridging Fund Facility will address the needs of the Secretariat, other SADC Treaty-established 
Institutions - SADC Tribunal, SADC subsidiary institutions such as the Regional Peacekeeping 
Training Centre (RPTC) and the Development Finance Resource Centre.213 At a later stage the 
Bridging Fund Facility will also fund member states and SADC-supported institutions mandated 
                                                
211 See, Peter Vale, (2003), “Ordering Southern Africa” in, Security and Politics in South Africa (Lynne Reinner Publishers: Boulder, London) p. 
122.   
212 Adekeye Adebajo (2007), “The Peacekeeping Travails of the AU and the Regional Economic Communities” in, John Akokpari, Angela 
Ndinga-Muvumba, and Tim Murithi (eds.) The African Union and its Institutions, p.131. 













to implement the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) and the Strategic 
Indicative Plan of the Organ (SIPO) priority areas linked to National Committees, SADC 
National Contact Points and respective sector ministries.214 A special Project Preparation Facility 
and Fund will also be set up and funded by South Africa’s Development Bank of Southern 
Africa. The purpose for the Project Preparation Facility and Fund is to assist SADC member 
states, in an intermediary capacity, to develop projects, up to the point that it is of a “bankable 
stage”.215 The EU commissioned institutional assessment of SADC and strongly recommended 
that SADC bring its financial management up to international standards.216 This is vital. SADC 
has to address the EU’s concerns and strengthen its financial management. 
 
SADC further, needs to achieve its regional security needs and recruit adequate staff within its 
structures. The cooperation of SADC member states is of critical importance for this to be 
realised. SADC’s National Committees (SNCs) were established according to its Treaty of 1992, 
to coordinate programmes and policies for its government, civil society organisations and the 
private sector. The SNCs are mandated to ensure that SADC programmes are implemented at a 
national level. The reporting line for state directed SNCs are to the SADC secretariat. This poses 
a problem for the Secretariat, since the SNCs are state-directed at national levels and therefore 
accountability becomes a challenge. The Secretariat’s lack of power and authority cannot hold 
SNCs accountable. Furthermore, the SNCs do not exist in all SADC member states and those that 
do exist are largely dysfunctional, lack technical capacity, and have ineffective coordinating 
mechanisms and inadequate resources.217 This will affect SADC’s ability to implement the 
desired security at regional level and has the potential to create a gap in its security architecture. 
Matlosa, and Lotshwao have argued that: “In part as a result of the paralysis of SNCs and the 
inherent weaknesses of the Secretariat in Gaborone, SADC lacks visibility at national level of its 
member states. It is not well known by ordinary people of the region. Thus, its relevance for the 
promotion of democratic governance, peace, security and political stability is not easily 
appreciated by the people of southern Africa besides the political elites. Even among the 
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enlightened political elites, it is the ruling groups that tend to have more confidence in SADC’s 
efforts in promoting democratic governance.”218  
 
Often, the political elites in SADC member states, who happen to belong to opposition parties 
have raised concerns that the regional economic community is purely a club of ruling parties 
whose main pre-occupation is to provide political solidarity to each other and who are not 
inclined to criticise each other in cases where authoritarian tendencies threaten democratic 
governance, constitutionalism and human rights.219 This was evident in 1998 when Zimbabwe 
experienced massive political and economic crises with land invasions sanctioned by the Robert 
Mugabe government termed as “fast track” land restitution, and resulting in the eviction of farm 
workers and largely white farm owners.220 These actions exacerbated poverty, unemployment, 
and escalated inflation rates, coupled with disputed presidential elections in 2002.221 Former 
South African presidents, Mbeki and Mandela opted to engage Zimbabwe through quite 
diplomacy tactics although Zimbabwean activists called for stronger action to be taken against 
Mugabe progress was very slow.222 In May 2000 Mandela spoke out in favour of Mugabe and in 
defence of the quiet diplomacy approach adopted by South Africa stating that this was the best 
mechanism to use in a violent political dispute over white land ownership in Zimbabwe.223 
According to Chris Landsberg, he quotes Mandela stating that: “It is no use standing on hilltops 
and shouting about such a highly sensitive matter. An approach though diplomatic channels 
without much publicity, is more likely to bring about a positive result…. I would personally 
support president Mbeki when he says we have diplomatic relations with Zimbabwe. Everything 
should be done through diplomatic channels.”224 Such stances adopted by some of SADC leaders 
may not be advantageous for SADC’s citizens. SADC’s approach to intervene in Zimbabwe’s 
security challenges was quite casual amidst 5 million Zimbabweans estimated to be suffering 
from food shortages, and in some cases starvation, with Zimbabwe’s inflation projected at 619,5 
percent in 2001.225 By 2001, huge food shortages were reported in Zimbabwe’s rural parts such 
as Matabeleland and Masvingo. Zimbabwe’s GDP per capita was US$471 in 2000 and was 
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steadily declining. Payments not made on foreign debt of US$4 billion, and debt servicing was 
behind US$690 million behind by June 2001, with inflation at 100 percent also in June 2001.226 
SADC’s response to the crisis in Zimbabwe has revealed the divisions within the Organisation, 
reflecting divergent political views and values. Hence SADC member states must not diverge 
from its policies and adhere to what they have committed to.227  
 
Problems facing SADC today are from SADC Summit level, down to the operational level, and 
have since its inception continually afflicted its peace and security structure. At the SADC 
Summit level,228 comprising of all heads of state and governments of SADC’s 15 members have 
entrusted all policy direction to this body to be the ultimate decision-making body and oversees 
the organisation’s functions by adopting protocols, declarations, conventions, and legal 
instruments.229 The SADC Summit elects its own Security Troika on an annual basis and 
currently in these roles are: DRC (Chair), Zambia, and Namibia.230 The executive secretary, 
(currently Mozambican, Tomaz Salomão), is appointed by the SADC Summit. Creation of new 
structures within SADC, and acceptance of new member states are made at the Summit level. 
The Organ and the executive secretary have no decision-making powers. All decisions 
concerning democracy and governance rest entirely with the Summit.231 These decisions are 
agreed on a consensus basis - whether it is the correct decision or not, and this can lead to 
problems. In the past in the old SADCC with less membership, (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) the consensus model 
sufficed. With the additional six member states, it may not be effective for the current SADC. 
Tackling SADC institutional reform may not be the answer to the desired outcome and it may be 
that the regional organisation addresses the crucial problems pertaining to decision making and 
state sovereignty.   
 
The OPDSC Troika system and the role of the chair is an important responsibility. Angola’s 
chairing of the Organ from August 2007 to August 2008 was questioned in terms of its 
unwillingness to deal with the Zimbabwe and DRC conflict situations, and failed to host any 
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high-level SADC meetings by the Troika or full Summit to discuss these matters; especially 
before, during, and after the election events of March and June 2008. Angola also failed to attend 
the AU Summit in Sharm el Sheik, Egypt in July 2008.232 SADC has to address its institutional 
capacity at the level of the OPDSC secretariat which has currently only 20 people to oversee 
different fields such as politics, military and police.233 This limited and inadequate staffing will 
hamper SADC’s overall security objectives. The abolishment of the Integrated Committee of 
Ministers (ICM) of August 2007 that replaced six ministerial clusters led to additional 
responsibilities for the secretariat. The 2008 SADC meeting in Mauritius has provided more 
support for the secretariat through the capacity building framework, and it is hoped that this will 
enhance its ability to deliver on its mandate more effectively. The Secretariat must also be 
supported with additional capacity and competences in programme management, planning, 
monitoring, finance, procurement, and administration.234 This may not be enough, and SADC 
may need to revisit the roles and responsibilities of the Secretariat and address how it can be 
reformed at policy level so that it has more executive powers on decision-making for achieving 
its security agenda.   
 
The political will and commitment displayed by SADC’s 15 member states in the security field 
remains a challenge for the Organisation. SADC and its institutions have developed over time, 
and it has been an important Organisation for the region. SADC’s policies however, require 
streamlining on an ongoing basis to meet global trends, demands and developments, and establish 
an effective standby force. SADC is not the means to an end, but only a vehicle that coordinates 
the region’s “Shared Future” - towards peace, security, and political stability and to achieve 
socio-economic development. The extent to which SADC achieves its shared future will be 
determined by the extent to which its member states commit themselves to the implementation of 
its policies.  
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